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Proportionality in Non-Capital
Sentencing: The Supreme Court's
Tortured Approach to Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
BY STEVEN GROSSMAN*
INTRODUCTION
There has always been debate about how, why, and to what extent
society should punish individuals who violate its norms. In this country
that debate has been conducted primarily on two levels. First, in
legislatures and among punishment theorists, the debate has revolved
around what are the appropriate goals of a criminal justice system and
how can a sentencing framework be developed to best accomplish those
goals.' Second, in the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, the debate
has involved the meaning of the ban on cruel and unusual punishment
contained within the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.2
This Article examines the Supreme Court's treatment of the Eighth
Amendment with respect to claims of excessive prison sentences.
Specifically, it addresses the issue of whether and to what degree the
Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment not be disproportionate to
the crime. In analyzing all of the modem holdings of the Court in this
area,3 this Article finds significant fault with each. The result of this
series of flawed opinions from the Supreme Court is that the state of the
law with respect to proportionality in sentencing is confused, and what
law can be discerned rests on weak foundations.
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. 1973, Brooklyn
Law School; LL.M. 1977, New York University School of Law.
'See infra notes 353-402 and accompanying text.
2 The Eighth Amendment reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
3 These modem holdings are Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), see infra
notes 7-69 and accompanying text; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam), see
infra notes 70-120 and accompanying text; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), see infra
notes 121-228 and accompanying text; and Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)
(plurality opinion as to Parts I-III; majority opinion as to Part IV), see infra notes 229-352
and accompanying text.
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This Article begins with an analysis of the modem proportionality
decisions of the Supreme Court in non-capital cases. It discusses the
various approaches taken by members of the Court and tracks these
approaches through each of the cases.4 The second portion discusses the
philosophical justifications of punishment and the impact these justifica-
tions have on attempts to frame a proportionality standard.' This Article
concludes by recommending a constitutional standard consistent with
accepted philosophical justifications of punishment and embodying
principles determined by the Supreme Court to be of critical impor-
tance.6
I. RUMMEL v. ESTELLE
The modem approach to the application of an Eighth Amendment-
based proportionality principle for prison sentences began with the
Supreme Court's holding in Rummel v. Estelle! William Rummel was
sentenced under a Texas recidivist statute that required life imprisonment
for anyone convicted three times of a non-capital felony. He argued that
such a sentence was disproportionate to the offense of which he was
convicted, or even to the sum of the three aggregate felonies that were
used to trigger the recidivist statute.'
Rummel was convicted by a jury in 1973 of theft for obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses? Under the relevant Texas statute, theft of
more than $50 was punishable by two to ten years in prison." The state,
however, chose to prosecute Rummel under the Texas felony recidivist
statute." Rummel's two previous felony convictions were a 1964 plea of
guilt to fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of services
and a 1969 plea to passing a forged check of $28.36. Rummel had
received prison terms of three and four years respectively for these two
4 See ihifa notes 7-352 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 353-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 385-402 and accompanying text.
7 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
'Id. at 267.
9 Id. at 266.
10 Id. at 265. The Texas Penal Code has been recodified since 1973, but for the
statute as it stood at the time of Rummel's conviction, see TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art.
1555b(4)(d) (West 1964).
" Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264. Article 63 of the Texas Penal Code, subsequently
recodified as TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42d (West 1974), mandated that anyone
convicted of a third felony be sentenced to life imprisonment.
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prior convictions.12 After his 1973 conviction, the trial judge imposed the
life sentence mandated by the recidivist statute.
13
The Texas appellate court rejected Rummel's challenge to his
sentence both on direct appeal and later on collateral attack 4 After his
petition for habeas corpus was rejected by the federal district court,
Rummel was successful in getting his sentence overturned by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 5 A panel of that court
determined that Rummel's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the
offenses he had committed and, therefore, was in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 6
However, on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the
finding of the panel and reinstated Rummel's life sentence. 7 In so doing,
the court emphasized the fact that Rummel's sentence should not be
considered overly lengthy because he would be eligible for parole in
twelve years. 8 Rummel then sought review in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Fifth Circuit
concluding that setting the maximum length of prison sentences for
criminal offenses is a role properly handled by legislatures, and not
appellate courts. 9 The Court based this conclusion both on its perception
of how the Eighth Amendment has previously been interpreted by the
Court in this realm20 and on its view of the proper role of judges in the
sentencing process.2' In both of these areas, the Court set a precedent that
R ummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66.
'3 Id. at 266.
'4 Id. at 267. See Rummel v. Estelle, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
"Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir.), vacated on reh'g, 587 F.2d 651 (5th
Cir. 1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
16 Id. at 1200. The Fifth Circuit relied on Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment contains a requirement for
proportional sentencing. Rummel, 568 F.2d at 1195. In considering how to apply such a
requirement, the court looked at a holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). Rummel,
568 F.2d at 1197. In Hart, the Fourth Circuit laid out four criteria that it asserted could
be used to objectify somewhat the determination of whether a particular sentence was
grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. See infra note 64.
'7 Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 268 (1980).
Id. at 274, 283-84.
Id. at 272-75.
z' Id. at 274-75. The Court maintained that subjective considerations which inevitably
enter into determining what constitutes an appropriate sentence are within the province
of the legislatures, not the appellate courts. It then rejected the criteria that Rummel
advanced as a means of objectifying a proportionality determination by the courts. Id. at
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led to a series of unpersuasive and unfortunate opinions with re-
spect to the application of the principle of proportionality in sentenc-
ing.
The Court in Rummel divided its analysis of previous holdings
involving Eighth Amendment proportionality into death penalty cases and
those involving imprisonment. As to the former, the Court concluded that
since death is a unique form of punishnent, previous Supreme Court
decisions in capital cases that had clearly discerned a proscription against
disproportional sentencing within the Eighth Amendment were "of
limited assistance"* in assessing whether jail sentences could be imper-
missibly long. Regarding non-capital cases, the Court said that successful
challenges to the proportionality of such sentences were "exceedingly
rare '24 and, in fact, analyzed only one such case, Weems v. United
State.
Decided in 1910, Weems was the first opinion of the Supreme Court
that clearly identified a requirement for proportional sentencing within the
Eighth Amendment.6 Weems, a disbursing officer for the Coast Guard
stationed in the Philippines, was convicted of falsifying a cash book in
the amount of 616 pesos. For this offense, Weems received a fine plus
275-83.
' Id. at 272. See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text regarding the Court's
treatment of capital cases as unique.
23 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
2 Id.
25 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 367. See also LARRY C. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 159 (1975). The first enunciation of the proportionality principle by a
member of the Court occurred in the dissent by Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 337-66 (1892), cited in Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to
the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to
Precedent", 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 28 (1985).
The defendant in O'Neilwas convicted of 307 mail order sales of liquor in what was
then a dry state. O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 327. His crime could have resulted in the
defendant's spending over fifty years at hard labor. Id. at 331. The Court rejected
the defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge because he had failed to preserve error, id.,
and because the Eighth Amendment had not yet been deemed to be applicable to the
states. Id. at 332. Justice Field, in a dissent that was joined by two other
Justices, wrote that ' punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged" violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). Thus, not only did
Justice Field identify a proportionality principle, but he also argued that excessive
length of sentence alone can constitute disproportionality. Id. at 340 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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fifteen years of a punishment called "cadena temporal."27 During the
cadena, the prisoner is chained from the ankles and wrists and forced to
perform what the Court called "hard and painful labor."'28 Even after the
incarceration period is over, the offender has no marital authority,
parental or property rights, and is subject to lifelong surveillance.'
Weems claimed that his punishment was cruel and unusual because of its
harsh and oppressive nature, and because the length of the sentence was
disproportionate to the offense he had committed. In its decision that his
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court seemed to
accept both of Weems' rationales."
The Court in Rummel, while acknowledging that the earlier holding
had found Weems' sentence to be disproportionate to his offense,
attributed this finding primarily to the "unique nature" of the cadena
punishment and not its length.3 The Rummel Court characterized the
Weems opinion as "consistently [referring] jointly to the length of
imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments'." '32 Weems is
correctly viewed, according to the Court in Rummel, as applying to its
"peculiar facts" 33 and having meaning only when all of those facts, the
"triviality of the charged offense, the impressive length of... [sentence],
and the extraordinary nature of the 'accessories"' are considered togeth-
er.' This Gestalt-like approach to the holding in Weems is significant
because it allowed the Court in Rummel to conclude that Weems is of
little assistance to one whose Eighth Amendment proportionality
challenge is based on length of sentence alone.35
The analysis of Weems undertaken by the Court in Rummel is
deficient in that it omits those aspects of the earlier holding which
support the position that Weems' sentence violated the Eighth Amend-
ment for two separate reasons, its length and its harshness. For example,
2 Weems, 217 U.S. at 358, 363-64.
2
' d. at 364.
' Id. at 364-65. The Court went onto describe Weems' continuing punishment after
his chains were removed. "He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept
within voice and view of the criminal magistrate ... subject to tormenting regulations
that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity,
and deprive of essential liberty.' Id. at 366.
30 Id. at 365, 366, 382. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
3' Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1980).
32 Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366,
372, 377, 380 (1910)).
31 Id. at 274.
34 Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 366).
31 Id. at 273-74.
1995-96]
KENTuCKY LAW JouRNAL
at one point the Court in Weems says of the sentence: "It is cruel in its
excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows
imprisonment.... Its punishments come under the condemnation of the
bill of rights both on account of their degree and kind."'36 Furthermore,
the Court in Rummel placed no weight on those parts of the decision in
Weems which declared proportionality to be an essential component of the
Eighth Amendment without alluding to the nature or uniqueness of the
cadena sentence.'
Only four years before Rummel was decided, the Court seemed to
take a somewhat different approach to Weems." The Court declared that
the decision in Weems, although acknowledging the cruelty of the cadena
punishment, "did not rely on that factor, for it rejected the proposition
that the Eighth Amendment reaches only punishments that are 'inhuman
and barbarous, torture and the like.' Rather, the Court focused on the lack
of proportion between the crime and the offense."39 Thus, while Weems
may not be a definitive holding that length of imprisonment alone can
make a sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to an offense, it
offers far stronger support for this position than is suggested by the Court
in Rummel."
36 Weems, 217 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
37 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. At one point the Weems Court declared. "It is a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportional to the offense."
Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. Interestingly, Justice White, in his dissent in Weems, interpreted
the majority's view of a proportionality requirement quite differently than the Court in
Rummel would later explain it. White's dissent is predicated on his disagreement with the
majority's analysis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and his belief that the
majority opinion improperly transferred sentencing considerations from the legislature to
the judiciary. Id. at 385 (White, J., dissenting). While Justice White did express some
confusion at the precise meaning of the majority's holding, he interpreted it as imposing
on the legislature the "duty of proportioning punishment according to the nature of the
crime, and cast[ing] upon the judiciary the duty of determining whether punishments have
been properly apportioned ... and if not[,] to decline to enforce [them]." Id. (White, J,
dissenting). See also id. at 386-87 (White, J., dissenting).
31 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
3 Id. at 171 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 368) (citation omitted).
o See Charles W. Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the
Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 385 (1980)
(arguing that Weems is best read as holding that both the conditions and the intensity of
a sentence can violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Thomas F. Cavalier,
Comment, Salvaging Proportionate Prison Sentencing: A Reply to Rummel v. Estelle, 15
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 285, 291-92 (1982). Twenty-three years before Rummel was decided,
one commentator summarized the then prevailing view of the holding in Weems by
writing. "Actually the great weight of authority sustains the propriety of the court's
inquiring into the severity of the sentence, so that a sentence which is clearly excessive
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The Rummel Court was similarly dismissive of the relevance of those
cases involving capital punishment that had clearly identified a propor-
tionality principle in the Eighth Amendment.4' Gregg v. Georgia, which
held that the death penalty was constitutional at least in certain circum-
stances,42 and Coker v. Georgia, holding that capital punishment is
disproportionate to the crime of raping an adult woman,43 had both been
decided only a few years before Rummel. Each of these decisions held
that punishments excessive in relation to the crimes committed were
violative of the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment."
Furthermore, each decision made clear that excessiveness alone, without
regard to the barbaric nature of the punishment, was sufficient to
invalidate a sentence.4 ' The Court in Rummel found these pronounce-
ments on excessiveness, because they appeared in capital cases, to be
"of limited assistance" in deciding the constitutionality of terms of
imprisonment."
Assuming arguendo both that the death penalty is a unique form of
punishment and that the Court's pronouncements in capital cases have no
bearing on other sentences,47 the Court in Rummel was still remiss in
ignoring the manner in which those capital cases interpreted earlier
proportionality holdings of the Court. Such an omission is particularly
glaring- when those earlier proportionality cases did not themselves
involve capital sentences. In fact, the interpretations of these earlier cases
which appear in both the Gregg and Coker opinions" reveal the hyper-
is in most jurisdictions said to constitute cruel and unusual punishment." David Fellman,
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 19 J. POL. 34, 35 (1957).
41 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
42 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plm-ality opinion).
4' 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-73.
45 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-73.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
4 But see infra notes 170-71 and 248-60 and accompanying text.
4, The plurality opinion in Gregg specifically rejected the notion that the Weems
Court had relied on the nature of the punishment alone in holding that Weems' sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment. Instead, according to the Court in Gregg, the holding in
Weems was based primarily on the disproportionality between Weems' crime and his
sentence. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171-72.
The Gregg Court found further support for the existence of a proportionality
requirement intwo other decisions by the Supreme Court involving non-capital sentences.
In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion), a soldier who deserted for one
day after escaping from the stockade was sentenced to denationalization. Id. at 88. The
Court in Gregg found it noteworthy that, although the decision in Trop was not based on
disproportionality, the plurality opinion at one point observed that "[f]ines, imprisonment
1995-96]
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bolic nature of the Rummel Court's assertion that, with regard to prison
sentences, "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision
of this Court that ... the length of the sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
49
The Court in Rummel, after examining the judicial history of
proportionality in sentencing, turned its attention to the role of appellate
courts in attempting to apply a principle of proportionality. The Court
was understandably concerned with the possibility that appellate judges
might use subjectively proportional sentencing requirements to substitute
their views as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence in a given case
for that of the trial judge or the legislature." Rummel attempted to
demonstrate that his sentence should be deemed unconstitutionally
excessive through the application of reasonably objective criteria.
Rummel argued that both the fact that all of his crimes were nonviolent
and the fact that individually (or even collectively) the crimes involved
relatively small amounts of money were objective evidence that his
crimes were not of a serious nature."1 The Court, however, considered
the seriousness of any crime to be an inherently subjective question and
regarded it as a matter for each state to determine according to its
particular needs and interests. In this instance the Court found that Texas
was primarily responding to the problem of recidivism and not merely to
specific crimes.' Once recidivist statutes are deemed to be rational
and even execution may be imposed depending on the enormity of the crime." Gregg, 428
U.S. at 172 (emphasis added) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100). The Gregg Court also
alluded to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), a case in which a statute that
punished for the crime of being a drug addict was invalidated. The plurality opinion in
Gregg noted that the Robinson holding, in discussing proportionality, asserted that "[t]he
cruelty in the abstract of the actual sentence imposed was irrelevant." Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 172. Instead, maintained the Gregg Court, "[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. at 172 (quoting
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667).
In Coker, the Court characterized Gregg as "firmly embrac[ing] the holdings and
dicta from prior cases, to the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the crime
committed." Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citations omitted). The declaration in Coker is not
limited to capital cases, and in fact, of the four supporting cases cited by the Court, only
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1971), involved a death sentence.
49 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. See also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 50-51.
' Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275. The Court expressed the same concern about subjective
judgments in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, and Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
"' Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275. Rummel's three crimes involved a total of $229. The
crimes, all of a nonviolent nature, were fraudulent use of a credit card, passing a forged
check, and obtaining money by false pretenses. Id. at 265-66.
'id. at 276.
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responses to the problem of repeat offenders, and Rummel did not
challenge this, how the statute is structured is a matter of line-drawing,
according to the Court." Although the Rummel Court appeared to reject
the concept of appellate courts becoming involved in this line-drawing
because, in its view, legislatures should set the parameters and trial judges
should make individual sentencing determinations within those parame-
ters, it nevertheless responded to Rummel's attempt to draw such a line
and to place his sentence on the cruel and unusual side of the line.'
In analyzing the Texas statute, the Court noted that only those felons
who have been convicted twice and incarcerated twice qualify for
mandatory life imprisonment.55 The Court apparently found it a signifi-
cant ameliorating factor in assessing harshness that the statute encompass-
es only those recidivists who have not been deterred by two previous
felony convictions and two separate prison terms.56
To Rummel's argument that only two other states sentenced third time
felons to mandatory life imprisonment and that even the sentencing
schemes in those states were less harsh than that of Texas,57 the Court
responded that often the differences among the states are "subtle rather
than gross."s Also, while the Court agreed with Rummel that the
possibility of parole after twelve years did not mean that his sentence
should not be regarded as life imprisonment for assessment purposes, it
' Id. at 275. Lines would have to be drawn assessing, first, the seriousness of the
crime and then, the harshness of the sentence.
Id. at 275-76.
"Id. at 278.
Id. The Court found support for its approach to such recidivist sentencing schemes
in Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276. In Graham,
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to a recidivist statute. The
focus of the opinion in that case was on the denial of the defendant's claims of due
process, equal protection, and double jeopardy violations. Only one sentence of the eleven
page opinion dealt with the Eighth Amendment, and it stated simply that the defendant's
punishment was not cruel and unusual. Graham, 224 U.S. at 631. It appears that the
extent of the Court's Eighth Amendment holding in Graham was that recidivist statutes
do not automatically constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 617.
"Rummel argued that in those two states, West Virginia and Washington, courts had
indicated a willingness to review such mandatory sentences, whereas in Texas no such
review occurred. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279. The Court dismissed Rummel's distinction,
noting that it would ultimately decide whether such judicial review was required, and in
any case, the salient fact was that the legislative judgments in West Virginia and
Washington were similar to that of Texas. Id.
" Id. Examples of "subtle" distinctions offered by the Court are as follows: states
that require four rather than three felonies for life imprisonment, states requiring violence
as a necessary element of one or more of the triggering crimes, and states giving the
sentencer discretion as to whether to impose life imprisonment. Id. at 279-80.
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"could hardly ignore the possibility" that Rummel might actually serve
a lesser period of time." To the Court, the significance of these com-
plexities in comparing recidivist statutes was not to show the flaws in
Rummel's particular analysis, but instead to demonstrate the inherent
difficulty in attempting to derive meaningfiul conclusions from such
comparisons.' Apparently more central to the Court's holding, however,
was its view that even if Texas' statute were clearly the harshest, our
federalist principles make inevitable, and even invite, disparate approach-
es by the states."
Writing for four Justices, Justice Powell's dissent first disputed the
contention of the majority that prior Supreme Court holdings articulating
proportionality principles were fact-specific. Next, Justice Powell
attempted to craft a method for assessing whether a sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime committed. Acknowledging the majority's
assertion that it is important to prevent such an assessment from turning
on the "personal predilections" of the reviewing judges,63 Justice Powell
expanded the criteria proposed by Rummel for objectifying the review
process. Specifically, Powell's approach would analyze the nature of the
offense and then compare the sentence imposed to the sentence for that
crime (or series of crimes) in other jurisdictions and to sentences imposed
for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.'
'9 Id. at 280-81.
6eId.
61 Id. at 282.
12Id. at 289-93 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell asserted that "[i]n both capital
and [non-capital] cases this Court has recognized that the decision in Weems v. United
States 'proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime."' Id.
at 290 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)).
Powell also cited opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion), Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion), in support of his claim that
the Court recognized a broad proportionality principle. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 290-93
(Powell, J., dissenting).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell offered support in prior Supreme Court
cases for his use of these three criteria. Regarding the nature of the offense, Powell cited
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598, wherein the Court acknowledged the seriousness of the crime of
rape but noted, "it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life." The Court in Coker held that while the death penalty may be an
appropriate sentence for murder, it is an "excessive" penalty for rape. Coker, 433 U.S. at
598.
With regard to a comparison of the sentence at issue to sentences for the same crime
in other jurisdictions, Powell again alluded to Coker. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell,
[Vol 84
NoN-CAPrrAL SENTENcING
Applying those criteria to the instant case, Justice Powell found that
because of their nonviolent nature and the relatively small amounts of
money involved, Rummel's crimes were not serious in nature.65 Next he
J., dissenting). In Coker, the Court considered it significant that after Furman invalidated
most death penalty statutes, only three states reinstated capital punishment for the crime
of raping an adult woman, and ultimately after two of those statutes were declared
unconstitutional because of their mandatory nature, only one state was left with such a
penalty for the rape of an adult woman. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-94. Additionally, Powell
cited Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (noting
that the enactment of new death penalty statutes in thirty-five states after Furman was a
factor in determining that the death penalty was not violative of the Eighth Amendment),
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion) (observing that "civilized
nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as
punishment for crime"), and Weems, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910). Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295
(Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell cited Weems in support of his third criteria, comparing punishments
for other crimes in the same jurisdiction. Id. In that case the Court, analyzing Weems'
crime, observed that, "[tjhere are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely."
Weems, 217 U.S. at 380. It then listed other arguably more serious crimes also treated less
harshly than was Weems' offense. Id.
Seven years before Rummel was decided, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit had used "objectifying" criteria to assess the proportionality of a non-
capital sentence in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974). The defendant inHart had been sentenced to life imprisonment after his third
conviction pursuant to a recidivist statute not unlike the one at issue in Rummel. Id. at
138. The Hart court used precisely the same three factors that Justice Powell would later
advocate in his dissent in Rummel, as well as a fourth factor that looked at the legislative
purpose of the sentence at issue. Id. at 140-42. In Hart, the court concluded that the
defendant's convictions for passing abad check, transporting bad checks across state lines,
and perjury did not wan-ant life imprisonment. Among other things, the court considered
it significant that the crimes at issue were all nonviolent and involved relatively small
amounts of money. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that while deterrence of repeat
offenders was an appropriate legislative purpose, even such a purpose did not allow for
unlimited punishment merely because some deterrence could be achieved (as the court
observed, capital punishment would deter even better). Instead the court looked at whether
the goal of deterrence could be accomplished with a punishment more commensurate with
the crimes committed. Id. at 140-41. For a discussion on limiting retibutivism see infra
notes 385-402.
This approach, considering whether a lesser punishment will achieve the relevant
sentencing goal, is similar to one facet of the test enunciated by the Supreme Court for
sentence excessiveness, at least in capital cases. In Gregg, the Court held that excessive-
ness could result from gross disproportionality or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction
ofpain," Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of this 'least
restrictive means" approach, see Margaret . Radin, The Jurisprudence ofDeath: Evolving
Standards For the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989,
1025, 1053 (1978).
6' Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that one of the crimes,
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observed that among the minority of states that have mandatory life
imprisonment recidivist statutes, the Texas statute is the harshest because
the others either (1) require more than three convictions, (2) require that
one of the felonies be violent, (3) limit a mandatory penalty to less than
life, or (4) grant discretion to the sentencer
With respect to his third objectifying factor, Justice Powell concluded
that Texas allows those who have committed crimes more serious than
Rummel to receive lesser sentences.' For example, murderers or
kidnappers in Texas could be sentenced to prison terms ranging from five
to ninety-nine years, and twice-convicted rapists could receive sentences
as low as five years imprisonment." Furthermore, to Justice Powell, any
sentencing scheme that equally punishes two people who have committed
markedly disparate crimes or series of crimes raises questions as to its
proportionality.69
The judicial struggle over the application of the Eighth Amend-
ment to proportional sentencing was to be fought primarily on two
fronts: interpretation of earlier Supreme Court cases (and later to be
added, other historical sources), and the existence of criteria that
meaningfully objectify an appellate court's determination as to whether
a particular sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime commit-
ted. This struggle would reappear in subsequent Supreme Court cases
with the Court apparently changing its mind and then changing its mind
again.
theft by false pretenses, was subsequently recodified as a misdemeanor).
Id. at 298 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority inRummel responded to use of the
interjurisdictional factor by observing that although one state will always be at the top of
the punishment rung for a particular crime, that fact does not mean that the state's statute
is cruel and unusual. While agreeing with this observation, Justice Powell maintained that
the use of such a comparison was still a valuable part of a multi-factored assessment of
proportionality. Id. at 299 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 300 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 301 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell acknowledged that Texas could
opt to punish recidivists more harshly than others convicted of the same crimes. However,
he went on to note that the Texas sentencing system distinguishes even among recidivists,
based on the seriousness of the crime committed. For example, one convicted twice of
unauthorized use of a vehicle does not receive the same sentence as one convicted twice
of rape. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell cited with approval the holding of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974), see supra note 64. Powell found it
significant that Hart did not become a vehicle for appellate judges to substitute their own
views regarding appropriate sentences for that of the legislatures and trial judges. Rummel,
445 U.S. at 304-05 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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IL HUTTo v. DAvIS
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to confront an Eighth
Amendment proportionality challenge to a non-capital sentence after
Rummel was the case of Roger Trenton Davis."0 Davis had been
sentenced by a jury in Virginia to a total of forty years imprisonment and
a fine of $20,000, based on his convictions for distribution and possession
with intent to distribute a total of nine ounces of marijuana." Unlike
Rummel's case, Davis' sentence did not involve a recidivist statute.
The road that Davis took to the Supreme Court was a long one,
starting with the exhaustion of his direct appeals. He was then granted a
writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court72 only to have that
writ reversed by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.'3 Sitting en banc, the appeals court reinstated the writ
granted by the district court.'4 The Supreme Court, upon a grant of
certiorari, vacated the decision of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the
case for reconsideration "in light of Rummel v. Estelle."'75 An equally
divided court of appeals again affirmed the issuance of the writ by the
district court,76 causing the state to again appeal to the Supreme Court.
This time the Court reversed the court of appeals and, in an unusually
stem opinion, reinstated Davis' original sentence.'
In granting the writ of habeas corpus, the federal district court relied
upon an earlier Fourth Circuit case that had developed criteria for
assessing a proportionality challenge to determine that Davis' sentence
70 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
71 Id. at 371.
, Davis v. Zabradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Davis v.
Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand sub nom.
Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370 (1982).
' Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d 153 (4th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on
remand sub noa. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub noa. Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
7 Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub noa. Hutto
v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand sub noa. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1981), rev'dwb noa. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
7' Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand sub noa. Davis v. Davis, 646
F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub noa. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
1' Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub noa. Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370 (1982).
" Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372, 375 (1982) (per curiam).
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violated the Eighth Amendment." These criteria were similar to those
used later by Justice Powell in his Rummel dissent. Applying the criteria
to Davis' sentence, the district court concluded that the crimes involved
were nonviolent in nature, the legislative purpose of the statute violated
could be served by significantly less severe punishment than that received
by Davis, the punishment imposed in Virginia was among the harshest
allowed in the fifty states, and crimes considerably more serious than
marijuana distribution carried maximum sentences of twenty years or less
in Virginia.79 Additionally, the court seemed to place particular emphasis
on the fact that Davis' sentence greatly exceeded that of all others
convicted of the same offense in Virginia's recent past.8" The court
observed that the various opinions of the Supreme Court justices in
Furman v. Georgia,"1 a case that invalidated Georgia's capital punish-
ment statute, had focused on the erratic nature of the sentence in that
case, and that Davis' sentence seemed to be similarly arbitrary.'
' Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 451-52 (W.D. Va. 1977) (citing Hart v.
Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974)), rev'd sub nom.
Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand
sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'dsub nom. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U.S. 370 (1982). See supra note 64.
7 Id. at 452-53.
" Id. At least some familiar with his case suggest the explanation for Davis'
comparatively long sentence "was not marijuana but miscegenation." Mike Sager, 9
Ounces Equals 40-Year Sentence, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1982, at B1, B3. Davis, a black
man, apparently had broken a social taboo in rural Wytheville, Virginia by dating white
women and ultimately marrying one. He was not -shy about his relationship with the
woman, and during that time he had a cross burned on his lawn. Additionally, Wythe
County newspapers and public officials were at the time paying a great deal of attention
to the danger of drugs. Davis, certainly no model citizen, was arrested in January, 1973
and later convicted of selling four LSD tablets. Sixteen articles in the local newspaper
were written about Davis and his involvement with drugs. Id. at B3. While reasons as to
why the local jury that sentenced Davis to such a strikingly long jail sentence are largely
speculative, his case argues for some kind of desert-based maximum. See infra notes 385-
402 and accompanying text.
81 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. at 453. The court observed. "If there is any one strand
linking together the opinions constituting the judgment of the court inFurman v. Georgia,
it is that the erratic, freakish, and unusual infliction of punishment raises problems of
Eighth Amendment proportions." Id. (citation omitted). The court then noted that for
convictions of the offenses of possessing, selling or manufacturing marijuana in Virginia's
recent past, "[t]he average sentence ... was three years and two months, the minimum
was sixty days and the maximum was fifteen years." Id. Comparing this to Davis'
sentence of forty years incarceration, the court joined in the conclusion of the man who
originally prosecuted Davis that his sentence was "grossly unjust." Id.
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In reversing the decision of the district court, a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted quite differently
previous holdings of the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. Presaging
the debate that would engulf the Supreme Court in proportionality cases
beginning with Rummel, the panel opinion saw Weems as a holding
pertaining primarily to the method rather than the length of punishment,
and therefore largely inapplicable to Davis' challenge." Turning next to
the use of disproportionality-determining criteria by the district court, the
panel opinion read Fourth Circuit precedent as reserving full application
of such criteria for sentences of life imprisonment.' For prison terms
measured in years, the panel held that an inquiry into excessiveness need
only consider the seriousness of the crime."5 Such sentences should be
overturned only when the sentence is so disproportionate to the crime as
to "shock human sensibilities.86
Additionally, the panel appeared to view Davis' crime as considerably
more serious than did the district court. The panel opinion stressed that
Davis knew the marijuana he was selling was in part destined for prison
inmatesY The jury that sentenced Davis was aware of this as well as
the fact that "this was not Davis' first trouble with the law in a drug
related offense."88 When considering these facts about his crime, the
panel said that Davis' sentence did not appear to "shock human sensibili-
ties." 8
9
Sitting en bane, the Fourth Circuit rejected the holding of its panel
and affirmed the granting of the writ.9 In a short per curiam opinion,
the court based its decision on the positions taken by the district court.9? '
" Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d
153 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980),
on remand sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'dsub nom. Hutto
v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
Id. at 1232.
'4Id.
,5 Id. at 1233 (quoting Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d 276, 276 (5th Cir. 1973)).
,7 Id. at 1233.
'4Id. at 1228.
S Id. at 1233.
Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto
v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on remand sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
9' Id. at 154 (citing Davis v. Zabradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd
sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d 153 (4th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on
remand sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982)).
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In reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
and instructing dismissal of the writ, the Supreme Court wrote a terse per
curiam opinion that appeared to foreclose virtually any proportionality
challenge in a non-capital case.92 The Court observed that the decision
in Rummel had made clear that any assessment of the excessiveness of a
prison term was inherently subjective and therefore "purely a matter of
legislative prerogative."93 The per curiam opinion reiterated the Rummel
holding that because of the unique nature of the death penalty, the Court's
pronouncements regarding proportionality requirements in capital cases
had little relevance outside that realm.' Furthermore, the Court noted
that in Rummel it had rejected each of the purported objectifying criteria
that had been relied upon by the district court in granting the writ.95 The
Court in Davis, again reiterating what it held in Rummel, warned that
successful challenges to the proportionality of sentences should be
"exceedingly rare,""6 and offered the example of life imprisonment for
overtime parking as such an extraordinary situation.97 So clear to the
Court was the message which it had sent in Rummel, that for the court of
appeals to have again affirmed the granting of the writ to Davis upon
remand "could be viewed as the [court of appeals'] having ignored
consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system
created by the Constitution and Congress."" In other words, the court
of appeals had not distinguished, but merely ignored, the holding in
Rummel.
Justice Brennan, writing for three dissenters, argued that while the
language in Rummel may be expansive, its holding is limited to the
premise that a state may validly choose to punish habitual offenders
severely to have a strong deterrent impact on prospective recidivists.99
92 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
Id. at 373 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).
'4 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373.
9s In rejecting the four criteria espoused by the Fourth Circuit in Hart, the Davis
Court reiterated the criticism of the factors it leveled in Rummel, that: the absence of
violence is not always detenninative with respect to what crimes should be considered
serious; the drawing of lines is inherently subjective and within the purview of the
legislature, not the courts; reliance on comparisons with other states raises federalism
concerns; and comparisons to the treatment of other crimes within the state in question
are inherently speculative regarding why the legislature chose to treat certain crimes more
seriously than others. Id. at 373 n.2 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76, 282).
9 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272).
9 Id. at 374 n.3 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.1).
Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also attacked the majority
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According to Brennan, the Rummel Court did not advocate abandonment
of all disproportionality analysis, but cited approvingly prior decisions
such as Weems." To Brennan, a sentence of forty years imprisonment,
roughly thirteen times greater than the average for others in Virginia
convicted of similar crimes, was grossly disproportionate to the crimes of
possessing and distributing nine ounces of marijuana."'
Justice Brennan noted two other developments that occurred after
Davis' sentence which shed light on his claim of disproportionality. The
prosecutor who charged Davis later wrote a letter expressing his view that
the sentence was both gravely disparate and "grossly unjust.'" Addi-
tionally, the legislature of Virginia changed the laws under which Davis
was punished so that by the time the Supreme Court considered Davis'
case, the maximum incarceration he could have received for his two
offenses was a total of twenty years."
Justice Powell, who authored the dissent in Rummel, also believed
that Davis' sentence was disproportionate to his crimes, but felt con-
strained by the holding in Rummel to concur in this case.1 Powell
agreed with the dissenters that Rummel left the door somewhat ajar to
proportionality challenges"0 5 and, as the dissent did, found both the
letter of the former prosecutor and the change in the maximum sentence
to be noteworthy." While Justice Powell observed that consideration
of the nature of Davis' crime accompanied by a comparison to the
sentences of others similarly situated could "arguably" justify upholding
the court of appeals' decision, Justice Powell believed that the facts of
for disposing of the case in a summary manner, without obtaining a full briefing or
hearing oral argument. Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan noted that Virginia had not claimed
that Davis was punished harshly, as Rummel was, because Davis was a habitual offender.
Therefore, in Brennan's view, the holding in Rummel was not determinative in Davis'
case. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 384-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 385 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Thomas B. Baird, Jr.,
prosecutor, to Edward L. Hogshire, Davis' defense attorney (Feb. 28, 1977)).
3 Id. at 385-86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248-1(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1981); id. §
18.2-10(e) (Michie 1975). Justice Brennan was not asserting that this reduction in the
maximum to which one could be sentenced for committing Davis' crimes, adopted by
Virginia after Davis' sentence, automatically invalidated his sentence. It was, however,
indicative to Brennan of recognition by the state that a sentence such as that received by
Davis is grossly disproportionate to the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to
sell. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).
105 Id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 377-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Rummel compelled him to uphold Davis' sentence.' Specifically,
Powell viewed Rummel's commission of "three minor frauds" as less
serious than Davis' willingness to distribute marijuana for use by prison
inmates, and observed that Rummel's sentence of life imprisonment was
longer than Davis' incarceration period. '
Thus, something of a three way division among the Justices
developed in Davis with respect to proportionality challenges. It is
difficult to discern clearly whether this division was one of degree or one
of kind. The majority apparently believed that such challenges should
rarely, if ever, be successful, using again the never-in-a-lifetime example
of life imprisonment for overtime parking as such a "rare" situation.1
0 9
To Justice Powell, discerning whether such a "rare" situation exists
apparently depends on whether the offense and sentence in the challenged
case are more disproportionate than those involved in Rummel's case (and
presumably hereafter in Davis' case as well)."0 The dissenters seem to
regard Rummel as essentially a case limited to recidivist statutes.' and
would apparently advocate that appellate courts in other cases engage in
proportionality analysis in keeping with the Eighth Amendment's
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' ' . The majority in Davis clearly rejected the objectifying
criteria used by the Fourth Circuit to assess a proportionality chal-
lenge."' In fact, it castigated the lower court for not recognizing that
the Supreme Court had so held in Rummel."4 It is not definitively clear
from the concurring opinion of Justice Powell whether he believed there
was any vitality left to either the above criteria or the similar factors
which he proposed in his Rummel dissent. In any event, it appeared to be
07 Id. at 379-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 374 n.3. See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980).
110 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 379-80 (Powell, J., concurring). This perhaps explains why
Justice Powell went to such pains in his later opinion for the Court in Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983), a case that overtumed a sentence on proportionality grounds, to
distinguish Rummel's sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole as less
severe than Helm's life sentence which allowed for release only by commutation.
Additionally, it may account for Justice Powell's questionable assertion in Solem that the
Court in Rummel "relied heavily" on Rummel's possibility of parole in deciding not to
invalidate his sentence. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983). See infra notes 209-24
and accompanying text.
H utto, 454 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)).
113 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373 n.2.
114 Id. at 373.
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Justice Powell's view that these criteria, at most, could inform a decision
as to whether a challenged sentence was more disproportionate than
Rummel's.'15 While the dissent did not explicitly address the notion of
objectifying criteria,"6 it did note that Davis' sentence was much
11 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, did not refer explicitly to the objectifying
criteria he enunciated in his Rummel dissent. He did, however, observe that Davis had
been "unable to show - by means of statutory comparisons - that his sentences suffer
from a greater degree of disproportionality than Rummel's did." Id. at 380. Therefore,
Powell's opinion can be interpreted as having at least looked at two of the objectifying
factors considered by the district court; intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons, and
having concluded that, again using Rummel as the standard, gross disproportionality was
not present. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine how these comparisons were applied
in Rummel and Davis.
The district court found that Davis' sentence exceeded the maximum penalty in all
but four states. Davis v. Zabradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 452-53 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd
sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aff'don reh'g, 601 F.2d 153 (4th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), on
remand sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). There was no information, however, as to whether offenders
convicted of crimes similar to Davis' in those states were actually sentenced to terms of
imprisonment as long as his. Id. InRummel, Justice Powell concluded that only two states
had recidivist statutes similar to the mandatory life imprisonment statute in Texas.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 296 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Regarding the intrajurisdictional comparison, the district court in Davis noted that
violent felonies in Virginia, such as murder in the second degree, stabbing with intent to
kill, and malicious shooting carried maximum sentences half of the sentence Davis
received. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. at 453. For voluntary manslaughter, an offender can
receive only one-eighth of the time that Davis received. Id. The district court in Davis
also regarded it significant that distribution of heroin in Virginia was treated no more
seriously than distribution of marijuana. Id.
In Rummel, Justice Powell observed that in Texas only those first-time offenders
convicted of capital murder faced mandatory life imprisonment. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 300-
01 (Powell, J., dissenting). First degree felons, such as those convicted of murder,
aggravated rape, or aggravated kidnapping, could receive from five to ninety-nine years
imprisonment. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Additionally, in Rummel, Justice Powell took
note of the fact that all three-time felons in Texas received the same mandatory life
sentence regardless of the gravity of the crimes committed. Id. at 301 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). He wrote: "In my view, imposition of the same punishment upon persons who
have committed completely different types of crimes raises serious doubts about the
proportionality of the sentence applied to the least harmful offender." Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
116The dissent, in a footnote, referred to the objectifying factors inHartused by the federal
district court in Davis, but only to make its point that the opinion of the Fourth Circuit enbanc,
affirming the district court, could not be said to have rested on the Hart factors. Hutto v. Davis,
454 U.S. 370, 384 n.2 (1982) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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harsher than those given to others convicted of similar crimes in Virginia
(one of the objectifying factors), "7 and it generally approved of the
approach taken by the court of appeals (which utilized the Fourth Circuit
criteria). 18
Davis was particularly noteworthy because, after all was written and
done, the Supreme Court had held that a sentence of forty years
incarceration for possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana
was not violative of the Eighth Amendment."9 As Davis was not
sentenced under a recidivist statute, the focus of any analysis had to be
the particular crime committed. If such a lengthy sentence for the sale of
a moderate amount of a relatively non-dangerous drug was not deemed
disproportionate, it is hard to imagine a sentence that would be so viewed
by the Court. At least, it was until one year later when the Court decided
Solem v. Helm.'
III. SOLEM . HELM
Jerry Helm was convicted of uttering a no-account check in 1979, a
felony under South Dakota law.' The maximum sentence for that
crime ordinarily was five years incarceration and a $5000 fine." Helm,
however, was sentenced under South Dakota's recidivist statute, which
imposed life imprisonment upon conviction of a fourth felony.' A
companion statute prohibited parole for those sentenced to life imprison-
ment.2 Under South Dakota law, Helm's only chance to be released
was to petition the governor for a pardon or commutation of his
sentence."z
Helm's challenge of the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds was
unsuccessful in the South Dakota state courts.' After seeking and
being denied commutation of his sentence by the governor, Hel sought
habeas corpus relief from the federal courts. 27 Although the federal
" Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
".. Id. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 375.
1 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Id. at 281 n.5. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-41-1.2 (1979).
" Solen, 463 U.S. at 281. See also S.D. CODIFID LAWs ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (Supp.1982).12 Solem, 463 U.S. at 281. See also S.D. CODIMD LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979)
(amended 1981).
'24 Solem, 463 U.S. at 282. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979).
'2' Solem, 463 U.S. at 282. See also S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
'2 State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1980).
127 Solem, 463 U.S. at 283.
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district court regarded his sentence as harsh, it denied Helm's request for
a writ, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rummel." Distin-
guishing Helm's sentence from Rummel's because the latter had the
possibility of parole after twelve years, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court and directed that the writ be
issued." Examining Helm's offenses, his sentence, and the sentence he
could have received in other states, the court of appeals concluded that
Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime committed
and violated the Eighth Amendment. 3 South Dakota then appealed to
the Supreme Court.'
Faced with its relatively recent decisions in Rummel and Davis, the
Supreme Court could have handled Helm's case in several ways. It could
have simply reversed the court of appeals, holding that Rummel and
Davis were controlling, and that as Helm's sentence was within the
statutory limit, it was purely a matter of legislative prerogative.
Alternatively, the Court could have chosen to explicitly reject the
holdings of Rummel and Davis and affirm the court of appeals."' As
MId.
"' Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aft'd, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
"0 Id. at 587.
' Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
13 Understandably, the Court was reluctant to overturn a decision that it had rendered
only three years earlier and had relied upon in a decision the previous year. However, the
Solem Court could have used its conclusion that Weems and other cases clearly identified
a proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment to hold that the entire premise
upon which the opinion inRummel was based was flawed. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-90.
Furthermore, the relatively cursory per curiam opinion in Davis did not undertake a
reassessment of Rummel, but merely applied the Court's reasoning in that case to Davis'
sentence. See Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374-75.
The Court could have found further support for the notion that Rummel relied upon
a flawed premise by alluding to its decision in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982),
a case decided after Rummel and Davis. The holding in Enmund was that the sentence of
death for a robber who aided and abetted a felony during which a murder was committed,
but who did not kill or intend to kill was disproportionate to his crime of felony murder
and violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 797-801. In Enmund, the Court cited Justice
Field's dissent in O'Neilv. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, L, dissenting)
and noted that it was quoted in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), to the
effect that the Eighth Amendment is directed against punishments that are disproportion-
ate because of their length or severity. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788. It also cited Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962), and Weems, 217 U.S. at 363, two non-capital
cases, as examples of cases where the Court had found sentences to be unconstitutionally
excessive even though no intentional wrongdoing was proven. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800.
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a middle-of-the-ground approach, the Court could have abandoned the
analysis employed in Rummel and Davis without actually overturning
their holdings. Finally, the Court could have decided, as did the court of
appeals, that the two previous cases were distinguishable from Helm's, in
part because Helm received a harsher sentence than did Rummel or
Davis."' The Court ultimately opted for a combination of the latter two
approaches, distinguishing Rummel and Davis, albeit unpersuasively, and
adopting an entirely different method for handling proportionality
challenges.
135
Justice PoweU's opinion for the Court in Solem began with an
expansion of the historical argument for proportional sentencing
previously advanced in his Rummel dissent.' 6 His premise was that the
framers of the Eighth Amendment, in banning cruel and unusual
punishments, had adopted the requirement of proportional sentencing,
notwithstanding the omission from the Amendment of any explicit
reference to proportionality. Justice Powell argued that English
Common Law, later embodied in the English Bill of Rights, included a
prohibition of disproportional sentencing." Therefore, according to
Even more significantly, the Court in Enmund determined that the defendant's
sentence was disproportionate only after analyzing in depth the nature of the crime
involved, id. at 797-801, comparing it to other crimes warranting the sentence the
defendant received, and looking to see how other states punished the crime at issue. Id.
at 789-93. The Court used these same factors in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-600
(1977) (plurality opinion), a case decided prior to Rummel. The Solem Court could have
found it significant that, after Rummel rejected the use of these factors as either too
subjective, entirely within the legislative purview, or encroachments upon principles of
federalism, the Court in Enmund accepted them as the basis for their proportionality
analysis. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89, 797; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-84. Therefore,
had the Court in Solem chosen to reject the holding in Rummel, it could have used
Enmund as evidence that, after Rummel, the Court had undercut both the theoretical and
pragmatic arguments advanced in Rummel.
' See Helm, 684 F.2d at 585.
13 Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-92.
136 Id. at 284-86.
"T Id. at 285, 286.
The Eighth Amendment, according to Justice Powell was "based directly" on the
Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason, who had incorporated the
precise language of the English Bill of Rights in the Declaration. Id. at 285-86 & n.l0.
But see Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel & Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). Professor Granucci argues that while the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the English Bill of Rights was intended, among
other things, to bar disproportionate penalties, there is evidence that the framers of the
American Bill of Rights misinterpreted this provision, believing it applied only to
barbarous punishments. Id. at 860-65.
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Powell, when the framers of the Eighth Amendment chose to use the
exact language of the parallel provision in the English Bill of Rights, they
intended to adopt the principle of proportional sentencing as well' 39
Justice Powell next turned his attention to prior Supreme Court
holdings involving the issue of proportional sentencing. Unlike the
opinion of the Court in Rummel, Justice Powell, saw no ambiguity in
Weems with respect to its endorsement of an Eighth Amendment-based
proportionality requirement.14 Additionally, Powell identified further
support for a proportionality requirement in cases in which the Court had
held a ninety day jail sentence for drug addiction to be excessive, 4' and
capital punishment to be unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime
of raping an adult woman'42 and to some felony murders.'43
While conceding that in both Rummel and Davis the Court had
indicated that proportionality challenges to the length of jail sentences
would rarely be successful, Justice Powell interpreted both decisions as
leaving the door somewhat open to such challenges.'" By confronting
the language in Rummel that seemed to foreclose proportionality
Justice Scalia would later take note of this point in Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 966-75 (1991) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.), in support of his assertion that the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle. If Granucci's point is correct
regarding misinterpretation of the English Bill of Rights by the framers, others have
argued that the original purpose of the English document is therefore irrelevant in fleshing
out the parameters of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 40, at 380.
Schwartz also points out that the assertion that the English Bill of Rights outlawed
disproportionate penalties is weakened somewhat by the fact that such punishments
continued with frequency after 1689. Id. See also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
974-75 (1991) (plurality opinion as to Parts I-IV; majority opinion as to Part V).
Schwartz takes issue with another historical justification for the proposition that the
Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality principle. This justification, less direct than
the previous one, is based on the belief that figures deemed to be instrnental in laying
the foundation for the Eighth Amendment, such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and
George Mason were influenced by the proportionality views of classical eighteenth
century criminologist Cesare Beccaria. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 381-82; see Deborah
A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. U.S. Excessive Punishment
Doctrine, 24 BuFF. L. REv. 783, 813-20 (1975). Charles Schwartz argues that the
connections between Beccaria and the Americans are both tenuous and unpersuasive.
Schwartz, supra note 40, at 381-82.
w Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86.
'40 Id. at 287.
141 Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
142 Id. at 288 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
143 Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)).
144 Id. at 289-90.
1995-96]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
challenges to the length of sentences, Justice Powell offered an interpreta-
tion that is at best unpersuasive and perhaps somewhat disingenuous. The
Court in Rummel wrote: "[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction
by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and
classifiable as felonies ... the length of sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative."' 45 Speaking for the Court in
Solem, Justice Powell imposed on the words "one could argue" an
interpretation that is literal to the extreme. To Powell, the Court in
Rummel with these words "did not adopt the standard proposed but
merely recognized that the argument was possible.""' In addition to
imposing this meaning on "one could argue," Justice Powell, as the
dissent in Solem points out, apparently ignored the words that followed:
"without fear of contradiction."'47 Taken together, these words would
hardly support Justice Powell's interpretation that the Court in Rummel
was apparently posing a hypothetical argument, similar to some sort of
academic exercise. However, apparently unwilling to hold that the Court
was wrong in Rummel when it declared that appellate courts have no role
in ensuring that sentences are proportional,4 Justice Powell and the
majority in Solem were forced into this interpretation. Unfortunately, this
tortured interpretation of the language in Rummel gave fodder to the
dissent49 and demeaned an opinion that otherwise could have been a
strong voice for the constitutional requirement of proportional sentencing.
Justice Powell went on to note the anomaly that would result from
a finding that the length of jail sentences was beyond the reach of
the Eighth Amendment.5 ' As both the more serious punishment of
death and the less serious sentence of a fine 52 are limited by
145 Id. at 288 n.14 (emphasis added) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274
(1980)).
146 Id. at 288 n.14.
147 Id. at 307 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274).
'4' Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
'o After noting that the majority opinion had quoted "incompletely" the passage from
Rummel, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "In context it is clear that the Rummel Court was
not merely summarizing an argument, as the Court suggests, but was stating affirmatively
the rule of law laid down." Slem, 463 U.S. at 307 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). See also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 46 (regarding the "strained"
reading of the opinion in Rummel by the Court in Solem).
0 Salem, 463 U.S. at 288-90.
151 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (applying a disproportionality
analysis to a death sentence for felony murder).
.. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (imposing parallel
limitations on bail, fines, and other punishments).
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Eighth Amendment proportionality requirements, it would be a strange
constitutional scheme that would leave the intermediate penalty of
incarceration free from such a restriction.
Thus the Supreme Court in Solem concluded that early constitutional
history" as well as prior holdings"M of the Court compelled the
conclusion that a prison sentence must be proportional to the crime
committed. ' While it gave legislatures and trial courts considerable
deference in establishing the lengths of jail sentences, the Court, in
requiring a comparison between crime and sentence, asserted that no
sentence was per se constitutional. ' Some method then must be
devised, according to Justice Powell, to assess the proportionality of a
sentence to the offense committed.57 Principly, this method must not
be limited to a single criterion which could hamper the ability of the
federal judicial system to render individualized sentences. ' With this
in mind, Justice Powell offered objectifying criteria that the Court had
used in other cases for assessing the constitutionality of a sentence.
First, the Solem Court, through Justice Powell, advocated looking to
the nature of the crime and its seriousness. 59 The Court had previously
focused on the nature of the crime in Robinson and Weems,6' as well
as in Coker when it decided that the death penalty could not be imposed
for the crime of raping an adult woman."6 Second, the Court regarded
as "helpful" a comparison between the sentence at issue and sentences for
similar or more serious crimes in the subject jurisdiction." Justice
Powell noted that the Enmund Court had observed that other murderers
facing capital punishment in Florida at the time "were more culpable"
than was Enmund. Third, the Court viewed as "useful" a comparison
between the sentence at hand and that which offenders receive for the
1 See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
,u See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
... Solen, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
156 Id.
" Speaking for the Court, Justice Powell concluded that once one acknowledges the
existence of a proportionality principle within the Eighth Amendment, a means must be
found for applying the principle to specific sentences. Id. at 290 n.17.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 291 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363, 365 (1910)).
" See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (plurality opinion).
8 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
1 Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795-96 (1982)). See also Weems, 217
U.S. at 380-81 (listing serious crimes subject to less serious penalties).
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same crime in other jurisdictions.'" The Court again alluded to Enmund,
where it had observed that in very few other states would there be a realistic
chance that capital punishment would be imposed on a felony murderer who
did not actually, nor ever intend to, take a life.'65
Although the objectifying criteria set out by Justice Powell in Solem had
some basis in that the criteria had been previously adopted in prior Supreme
Court cases, 66 Justice Powell ignored the fact that the Court in Rummel and
Davis specifically rejected the use of these three factors." In Rummel, the
Court regarded the first two factors as inherently subjective and the third as
merely the inevitable result of federalism at work.' Following Rummel,
the per curiam opinion in Davis rejected the use of essentially the same
factors by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, noting
that the Rummel Court had rejected them as well.69
Instead of ignoring explicit statements in Rummel and Davis rejecting the
objectifying factors, the Court in Solem would have been better served had
it expanded upon and more greatly emphasized a point it made earlier in its
opinion: although death is a unique form of punishment, it is incorrect to
regard all analysis in capital cases as wholly inapplicable to non-capital cases,
as did the Court in Rummel. 7' Developing that point would have served as
a response to the rejection of a factored approach for assessing propor-
'"Id. at 291-92.
165 Id. at 292 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792). See also Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97;
Weems, 217 U.S. at 380 (similar crime was punishable by two years imprisonment and a fine).
' The Court considered the first factor, nature of the crime, in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98; and Weems, 217
U.S. at 363, 365.
The Enmund Court used the second factor, comparing the sentence at issue with that
of similar crimes in the subject jurisdiction. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795-96.
The third factor, comparing the sentence at issue with that of the sentence for the
same crime in other jurisdictions, was also used in Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792.
'67 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 & n.2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 275-82 (1980). It is important to note that while the court in Rummel
rejected the three factors adopted by the court in Solem, the court identified no acceptable
means of proportionality to replace them. Id. at 275-82. Perhaps the court in Rummel, in
effect, rejected the need to do any proportionality analysis with regard to the excessive-
ness of prison sentences. See generally supra notes 19-61 and accompanying text.
6 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-82; see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
9 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373 & n.2; see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
... In Solem, Justice Powell noted that when the proportionality principle was
previously used by the Court in capital cases, no distinction with non-capital cases was
ever drawn. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983). While conceding that there is
some limit to the application of principles enunciated in capital cases to other cases
because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Justice Powell argued that proportionality
analysis still has some viability in non-capital cases. Id. at 289-90.
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tionality challenges. Specifically, the Court in Solem might have acknowl-
edged that the severity and finality of capital punishment compel certain
procedures for the protection of the defendant in capital cases which might
otherwise not be necessary. However, once those procedures are deemed
necessary to non-capital sentences as well, what capital cases tell us about the
most sensible means to make the procedures meaningful and effective is
relevant, if not controlling, in future cases. Here, once the Court held that
courts need to assess the proportionality of challenged prison sentences, the
particular factors already used to assess such challenges in capital cases, as
well as those used by the Court in other cases, are most instructive.'
Although it largely ignored the fact that the Court in Rummel and Davis
had rejected the above enumerated objectifying factors, the Court in Solem
did take issue with the assertion in these earlier decisions that an assessment
of the seriousness of a crime was too subjective a determination to inforn a
decision as to the proportionality of a sentence." The Court pointed out
that based on clearly established principles, it is well accepted that certain
crimes are considered more serious than others. Without enunciating all
such principles, the Court stated that seriousness can be determined by
looking to: The harm caused by the crime," the use of violence,' the
magnitude of the crime,'76 and the culpability of the offender.'
11 In fact, when describing the objectifying factors to be used in assessing the
proportionality of Helm's sentence, Justice Powell alluded to the use of similar factors in
capital cases. Id. at 291-92.
17 Id. at 292. The Court, in Rummel, considered the seriousness of any crime to be
an inherently subjective question and regarded it as a matter for the states. See supra text
accompanying note 52. However, the Solem Court did not take that approach. Studies
indicate that there is something of a broad societal consensus regarding the general
seriousness of crimes. ANDREW vON HmscH, PAST OR FtmURE CRMES 63-76 (1985).
Where differences have been observed regarding the view of the gravity of certain crimes
among participants in such studies, these differences often occur among people of varied
ages and educational levels. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 97 (1991). Presumably,
appellate judges, among whom there would be fewer educational and age disparities than
among the populace as a whole, would find even more common ground with respect to
assessing the seriousness of particular crimes.
173 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93. For example, stealing a million dollars is certainly
more serious than stealing a hundred dollars. Id. at 293.
174 Id. at 292.
17S Id. at 292-93 (noting that violent crimes are more serious than nonviolent crimes).
176 Id. at 293 (noting that a lesser included offense should not be punished more than
the greater offense, that completed crimes are more serious than attempts, and that an
accessory's penalty should not be higher than that of the principal).
'- Id. at 293 (observing that state courts may take into account whether the criminal
conduct was malicious, intentional, reckless, or negligent). Other models for gauging
seriousness exist, but generally they involve an assessment of the same or similar factors
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Regarding the harshness of the punishment imposed, the Court in
Solem had no difficulty in concluding that longer jail terms are harsher
than shorter ones, and that capital punishment is harsher than all jail
sentences.7 ' The difficulty arises in determining where to draw the
lines of acceptability.'" Two examples of when the Court has engaged
in such judicial line-drawing are in cases confronting the issues of when
the right to a speedy trial is violated&'8 and when the right to a jury trial
is triggered.''
Having discussed the first and second criteria elucidated by Justice
Powell in Solem, it is necessary to discuss the third criterion, which
compares sentences among jurisdictions. In addressing criticism against
the use of this factor, the Court in Solem acknowledged that a wide range
of sentences inevitably exists due to the nature of our federal system, as
as those used by the Court in Solem.
von Hirsch sees two major components to seriousness: harm and culpability. The
harmfulness of a criminal act, to von Hirsch, embodies all of the foreseeable consequenc-
es of the act. He defines culpability or accountability as an assessment of the intent,
motive or circumstance of the offender. VoN HiRsCH, supra note 172, at 64-65.
In rating the harm of an act, von Hirsch adopts the categorization into serious,
intermediate and lesser harms. Id. at 67 (citing JOEL FFINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 37-45,
185-214 (1984)). Serious harms are those that invade "welfare interests." Id. at 67 (citing
JOEL FFiNBERG, HARM TO OTHRS 37-45, 185-214 (1984)). Welfare interests are those
interests crucial to choosing and ordering the way we live. Id. Crimes that cause serious
physical injury or economic crimes that deprive persons of their entire means of support
would fall into this category. Id. at 68-69. Intermediate harms are considered to be those
that invade our "security interest" or which "cushion a welfare interest." Id. at 69. Having
one's home burglarized or being periodically beaten would be considered intermediate
harms. Id. Lesser harms invade "accumulative interests," those things that allow us to
pursue the good life. Id. at 70. Common petty theft would be an example of a harm that
invaded an "accumulative interest." Id.
Degree of culpability, according to von Hirsch, is determined by the offender's state
of mind (purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent), the existence of excuse (i.e.
necessity or duress), mental disturbance that does not constitute legal insanity, and the
motives of the offender. Id. at 71-73. See also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 69,
focusing on the culpability of the offender, looking at whether it was a crime to property
or person, whether the conduct was intentional or negligent, and whether the harm was
actual or threatened.
"N Solem, 463 U.S. at 294.
17 Ird.
So Id. at 294-95 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (identifying objective
factors to be used in determining whether or not a particular delay in bringing a defendant
to trial was excessive)).
1 Id. at 295 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (drawing the line at
six months incarceration in determining when defendant had the right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment)).
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well as the need for individualized sentencing." However, this does
not justify dismissing this factor, according to the Court, but argues for
the use of a combination of factors with no factor alone determining
disproportionality.'8'
Having defended its adoption of the three objectifying criteria, what
remained for the Court was to apply the particular facts of Solem. In
applying the first objectifying factor, the gravity of the crime, the Court
noted that Helm's crime of uttering a no-account check for $100 was
"'one of the most passive felonies a person could commit.'"'u The
crime was completely nonviolent and involved a relatively small amount
of money."8 5 Although acknowledging that it was proper to sentence
Helm for his past crimes as well, the Court regarded these prior crimes
also as "relatively minor." ' 6 Notably absent from the Court's assess-
ment of the gravity of Helm's crimes was any comparison between the
seriousness of Helm's criminal record and that of Rummel." This
omission is particularly glaring as the Court's assessment of the harshness
of Helm's sentence relied significantly on a comparison to Rummel's
sentence."ra Perhaps this omission occurred because, in the words of the
dissent, "by comparison Rummel was a relatively 'model citizen.""'89
Regardless of why this omission occurred, it is necessary to compare
the criminal records of Helm and Rummel. It is fair to say that Helm's
criminal record was significantly worse than Rummel's both as to the
quantity and the quality of criminal activity. Regarding quantity, Helm
was being punished as a recidivist after being convicted of his seventh
felony,' whereas Rummel had committed only three felonies.'" As
"82 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n.17. See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282
(1980) (recognizing that under the notions of federalism, states will have differing views
of the severity of crimes).
m Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.17.
14 Id. at 296 (citing State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson,
J., dissenting)).
"I Id. at 296-97.
"' Id. at 296-97. The Court took note of the fact that Helm's prior crimes were also
nonviolent and involved small amounts of money. Additionally, the Court observed that
Helm was an alcoholic and that incarcerating him for life was unlikely to substantially
advance any goals of punishment. Id. at 296-97 n.22.
17 While aven-ing that the focus of its proportionality determination would be on the
crime triggering the recidivist statute, the Court acknowledged the relevance of Helm's
prior convictions to its assessment of proportionality. Id. at 296 n.21.
.. Id. at 297. See inffra notes 209-24 and accompanying text.
19 Solem, 463 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 279-80.
191 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980). It is also noteworthy that while
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to the quality of the crimes involved, the Court is technically correct in
stating that Helm's three burglaries and third offense intoxicated driving
crimes were nonviolent." However, it could be maintained, as the
dissent stated, that each posed the possibility of violence."3 Rummel's
three convictions, it should be recalled, each involved some entirely
nonviolent act of dishonesty to obtain small amounts of money.'
These crimes would seem quite similar to Helm's triggering bad check
offense, which the Court characterized as among the least serious types
of felonies." 5 However, unlike Rummel, Helm had been convicted of
burglary. " ' Burglary requires an illegal entry and can be viewed as
more serious criminal conduct, involving greater risks of harm.'
Further, Helm, as a repeat burglar, raised the likelihood that at least some
of his criminal activity could have caused injury.
Regardless of one's conclusion after comparing the criminal records
of Rummel and Helm, the Court in Solem weakened its opinion by failing
to attempt such a comparison. For a Court championing other compari-
sons, this failure is particularly noteworthy. Had the Court rejected the
holding in Rummel, it could have ignored, or at least downplayed, the
relevance of the facts in that case, including Rummel's criminal record.
By attempting to reconcile these two entirely different, if not opposing,
decisions while ignoring the obvious need to compare criminal records,
the Court again weakened its holding.
In comparing South Dakota's treatment of other comparable and more
serious crimes, the next objectifying factor, the Court noted that only
crimes far more serious than Helm's, such as murder or kidnapping,
could result in life imprisonment."' Acknowledging that Helm's sen-
tence as a recidivist compelled it to consider his prior crimes as well, the
Court maintained that even for second or third time felons to receive life
imprisonment, the crimes at issue had to be far graver than those
committed by Helm. 9 While this may be true, it could be argued that
Rummel'sthird felony conviction barely qualified him for life imprisonment under Texas'
recidivist statute, Helm's seven felonies were well beyond South Dakota's requirement of
four felony convictions.
L2 Solem, 463 U.S. at 297.
"' Id. at 315-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
R' ummel, 445 U.S. at 266.
'g Solem, 463 U.S. at 278.
6 Id. at 279.
7 Id. at 279 nl.
L" Id. at 298.
L Id. at 298-99. The Court alluded to South Dakota criminal statutes which allowed,
but did not require, life imprisonment for serious crimes such as first-degree manslaugh-
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the state has related, but somewhat separate, goals in incarcerating for life
someone who, by being convicted of seven felonies in eleven years, has
demonstrated complete disregard for society's laws. Such a goal can take
the form of general deterrence, by communicating to other potential
recidivists that there is a limit to their felonious criminal activity."'0 It
can take the form of retribution or just deserts by making the societal
statement that those who continuously ignore our laws against com-
mitting non-petty crimes deserve to be incarcerated for life. 0 ' While
neither of these goals necessarily justifies the specific sentence in Helm's
case, the Court should have considered these traditional sentencing
goals."2 This is especially true because at one point the Court, noting
ter, attempted murder and kidnapping, and to other statutes which did not permit life
sentences even for third convictions of crimes such as aggravated assault or heroin
dealing. Notwithstanding that Helm's sentence was the product of the sum total of his
seven convictions, the Court thought it significant that Helm'striggering crime was far
less serious than other crimes for which South Dakota offenders receive milder sentences.
Id.
See generally HERBEERT L. PACKER, TEE LIMITS Op THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39-
45 (1968); Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects ofPunishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 949 (1966); infra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
2o Noted desert theorist Andrew von Hirsch posits two approaches to retribution-
based assessment of criminal records. VON HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 80-81. The less
desirable approach, according to von Hirsch, is an examination of and focus upon the
offender's entire criminal career to determine what sentence he or she deserves. Id. Such
an approach is contrary to the primary purpose and strength of our judicial system,
determining the culpability of the defendant for the particular crime charged, and the
seriousness of that crime, von Hirsch argues that the system is not designed to inquire
with any rigor into such issues regarding prior criminal conduct. Id.
von Hirsch prefers an approach that focuses on the present crime but attaches
relevance to the prior criminal record with respect to the defendant's plea that as a fallible
human, he or she is deserving of some degree of sympathy. Id. at 81-82. Such sympathy
should be afforded or denied, according to von Hirsch, in proportion to the blameworthi-
ness of the defendant's criminal past. In other words, the disapprobation directed at the
offender due to his criminal act "should be dampened somewhat because the act was out
of keeping with his previous behavior." Id. at 83.
2 In theory, a life sentence for recidivists can also be based on a third justification
for punishment - incapacitation. This justification for punishment is premised on the
belief that certain criminals, because of the seriousness of their offenses and the likelihood
of their committing future crimes, pose such a threat that they need to be separated from
society. See 1-5 NICHOLAS N. KTIrraE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING,
AND CORRECIONS 13 (1981) (stating that separation from society by incapacitation is
appropriate when the safety of society is at risk, such as with murder, rape and residential
burglary). Presumably the nature of the offenses committed by both Helm and Rummel
would not be serious enough to justify life imprisonment based on the need for either's
incapacitation.
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Helm's alcohol addiction, commented that a life sentence in this case "is
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any
substantial way."" 3 The only goal it alluded to was that of rehabilita-
tion, which, according to the Court, was unlikely to occur without the
incentive of Helm's possible release from prison2"
In applying the final objectifying factor, the Court in Solem adopted
the finding of the court of appeals that in only one other state could
Helm, as a recidivist, have received life imprisonment for the crime he
committed."0 5 Furthermore, as the Court noted, even in that state,
Nevada, a life sentence would be discretionary,"6 and there was no
information that such a sentence had actually been imposed on anyone
whose offenses were as "minor" as Helms .207
After concluding that each of the three objectifying criteria pointed
to the disproportionality of Helm's sentence, the Court turned to the
severity of the sentence itself20" Specifically, the Court rejected the
state's attempt to compare Helm's sentence with the sentence received by
Rummel.2. 9 The Court noted that under Texas law Rummel was eligible
for parole, and that parole could be granted as early as ten years into his
sentence and could be reasonably expected in twelve years.2 ' Under
South Dakota law, Helm had no possibility of parole and could be
released only through executive clemency.2"' The Court in Solem
recognized that "the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally
different from the parole system that was before us in Rummel '"2'
The Court characterized parole as a "regular part of the rehabilitative
process,"21  usually embodying specific procedures and standards.
While one may legitimately have an expectation of parole at some time,
the granting of executive clemency with regard to commutation,
according to the Court, is purely ad hoe.214 The Court further noted that
= Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.22.2M Id.
2" Id. at 299 (citing Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 586 (8th Cir. 1982), qf'd, 463
U.S. 277 (1983)).
2 Id. at 299-300 (citing NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.010(2) (1981)).
217 Id. at 300.
2N Id.
2 Id.
210 Id. at 301-02 (citing Tsx. CODE CPIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15b (West 1979)).
21 Id. at 297, 302-03.
212 Id. at 300.
21 Id.
24 Id. at 301. In support of the distinction it draws between executive clemency and
parole, the Court alluded to its earlier decisions in Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
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Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); and Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Dunschat, the Court held that
life prisoners have no constitutional right to commutation. 452 U.S. at 465. In Morrissey,
individuals free on parole were deemed to have due process protection when the state
seeks to have their parole revoked. 408 U.S. at 471. In Greenholtz, the Court held that
but for a unique provision in the Nebraska parole statute, the possibility of being paroled
does not afford a due process liberty interest. 442 U.S. at 7-8. The view expressed by the
Court in Solem that these decisions elucidate the fundamental difference between
commutation and parole is open to question. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-01.
For example, the Solem Court discerned a significant difference between parole and
commutation in that the former is a "regular part of the rehabilitative process" and "the
normal expectation in the vast majority of cases," id. at 300, whereas the latter is "an ad
hoc exercise of executive clemency." Id. at 301. In Dunschat, the inmate argued that,
based on Connecticut's regular practice of commutation, he had an expectation of
commutation amounting to a liberty interest. The Court responded to this argument by
noting that merely because a privilege has been granted generously does not create an
entitlement out of that privilege, and that requests for a parole or for commutation were
both "appeals for clemency." Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 465. Although it was considering the
existence of a liberty interest for due process purposes rather than assessing the harshness
of a sentence, the Court in Durnschat seemed to downplay any constitutional distinction
based on the likelihood of release where the decision to release remained purely
discretionary.
The Court in Solem cited Morrissey in support of the distinction it drew between
parole and commutation based on the "established" nature of parole. Solem, 463 U.S. at
301 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477). Morrissey, however, involved an individual
then at liberty whose parole the state was seeking to revoke. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472-
73. The Court went to great lengths to distinguish the position of such a person from one
who is in prison only hoping for release through parole or commutation. Id. at 482, 479-
80. In considering the sentences of both Rummel and Helm, the Court was looking at
individuals both of whom would be in the latter position, thereby possessing a liberty
interest inferior to that of the offender in Morrissey.
The Solem Court further sought to bolster its argument by refening to the passage
in Dunschat wherein the Court commented on "the vast difference between a denial of
parole ... and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." Solem, 463 U.S. at 301
(quoting Dwnschat, 452 U.S. at 466). Omitted from this quotation as it appears in Solem
are the connecting and somewhat limiting words, "particularly on the facts of
Greenholtz." Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466. Greenholtz held that due process protections are
normally not available to inmates seeking parole. The Court in Greenholtz recognized that
the statute at issue in that case, however, had both "unique structure and language."
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. That statute mandated parole unless certain conditions existed.
Therefore, according to the Court, it created a modified liberty interest because it went
considerably beyond the discretionary nature of other parole statutes. Id. Placed in the
context of Greenholtz, therefore, the quote from Dumschat used by the Court in Solem,
463 U.S. at 301, is not as strong a statement regarding the parole/commutation distinction
as it is purported to be.
Furthermore, as it had done in Morrissey, the Court in Greenholtz emphasized the
difference between the state's seeking to take away one's freedom and its decision to deny
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South Dakota in fact had rarely commuted life sentences,"' and even
if commutation occurred, that would only make Helm eligible for pa-
role.2 16
The distinction drawn by the Court in Solem between parole and
commutation through executive clemency, based on their respective
likelihoods, is a reasonable one. It would skew an attempt to apportion
crime to punishment were the Court to ignore the difference between a
sentence that will likely result in the defendant's release and one for
which the possibility of release is just one step beyond the theoretical.
What is debatable is the Court's assertion in Solem that the opinion in
Rummel "relied heavily" on Rummel's possible parole.217
The Court in Rummel specifically rejected the state's attempt to treat
Rummel's sentence as something less than life imprisonment because of
the possibility of parole.21 It did, however, note that an assessment of
Rummel's sentence "could hardly ignore" ' the possibility of release,
and this possibility distinguished Texas' statute from one that contains no
parole possibility. Still, it is noteworthy that the Court in Rummel devoted
part of one paragraph to this point in an opinion that focuses far more
heavily on why there is no proportionality requirement in the Eighth
Amendment.
The context of the Rummel Court's discussion of the possibility of
parole also suggests something less than heavy reliance on this point in
reaching its decision. The purpose of the section of the opinion in which
the Court discusses the possibility of parole is to demonstrate that
parole to an incarcerated inmate. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9. The Greenholtz Court
observed that the decision to release on parole involves "purely subjective appraisals by
the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of
evaluating the advisability of parole release." Id. at 10. The same could be said of
commutation. The parole decision, according to the Greenholtz Court, is "[u]nlike the
revocation decision, [because] there is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision
for the individual." Id. Again, the same could be said for commutation.
Thus, while distinctions can be drawn between the possibilities of parole and
executive commutation, the Solem Court's implication that the decisions in Greenholtz,
Morrissey, and Dumschat demonstrate the fundamental nature of these distinctions is
questionable.
25 Solem, 463 U.S. at 302 & n.29.
216 Id. at 302-03.
27 Id. at 297.
"1 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980). The Court so held because
of Rummel's "inability to enforce any 'right' to parole." Id. See also supra note
214.
29 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281.
=Id.
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Rummel's proposed comparisons are more complex than he suggests.'"
This complexity is then offered to support the Court's view that such
comparisons are necessarily unrevealing and unhelpful in assessing
proportionalitYT' The Court's central point in this section seems to be
that even if a court could see through this complex comparison to
conclude that a particular state's treatment of a crime is the harshest in the
fifty states, our federalist system always will result in one state's being
the harshest.' Such a result, according to the Court in Rummel, hardly
indicates that such a sentence is therefore "grossly disproportionate" to
the crime.' This is because each state has its own reasons for punish-
ing some crimes more harshly and others more leniently than do other
states. Thus the discussion of the possibility of parole as an ameliorating
factor in Runmel's sentence appears to be ancillary and is used primarily
by the Court in Rummel for a different purpose and to a lesser extent than
suggested by the Court in Solem.
The result of the holdings in Rummel, Davis, and Solem was to send
a mixed and confusing message with respect to the Supreme Court's
approach to the requirement of proportional sentencing.' Reconciling
the three holdings, all still deemed by the Court to be good lawne was
no easy task for lower courts attempting to assess proportionality
challenges. Is there a clear proscription against grossly disproportionate
sentences; to what types of cases does this proscription apply; and how
do we assess such challenges were all questions that seemed to produce
different answers when looking at Rummel and Davis as opposed to
Solem. It is therefore hardly surprising that eight years after Solem was
2n Id. at 280-82.
=Id.
23 Id. at 282.
2 Id. at 281.
"2 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 47.
22 One commentator suggests the possibility that the Solem Court may have refused
to overturn the decision in .Rummel to preserve its factual holding that life imprisonment
may be a permissible sentence for one who commits three nonviolent felonies or to signal
to lower courts that most challenges to the proportionality of sentences should still be
rejected. Barton C. Legum, Comment, Down the Road Toward Human Decency: Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L. REV. 109, 133-34
(1983).
2 For example, certain courts attempting to reconcile Rummel and Solem, have
concluded that extensive proportionality analyses should be performed only in cases
involving life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See United States v. Owens,
902 F.2d 1154, 1158 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 860 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988); United States v. McCann, 835 F.2d 1184, 1187-
90 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988); Chandler v. Jones, 813 F.2d 773,
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decided the Court again waded into the proportionality morass.
Unfortunately, once again the result was an unsatisfying mixture of
confusion and division.
IV. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
Ronald Harmelin was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine
under a Michigan law that mandated life imprisonment without parole for
possessing a large amount of drugs.' After some initial success in
challenging his conviction in the Michigan Court of Appeals,s both
his conviction and his sentence were ultimately affirmed by the Michigan
courts." 1 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' to
review Harmelin's claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual because
it was grossly disproportionate to his crime and because it was statutorily
imposed, giving the judge no discretion. A badly fractured Court
rejected both of Harmelin's arguments.
Five Justices joined in Part V of Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court, holding that while severe mandatory punishments could be
considered cruel, they were not historically unusual.' These Justices
778-80 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987); Tice v. State, 491 So. 2d 1065, 1066-67 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986); State v. Carlton, 733 S.W.2d 23, 25-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Other courts used the Solem criteria to conduct such analyses regardless of whether
the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. See United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d
984, 989-90 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendants' sentences ranged from four to nine years); United
States v. Restrepo, 676 F. Supp. 368, 377-78 (D. Mass. 1987) (defendant sentenced to
five years); Olds v. State, 484 So. 2d 517, 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (defendant
sentenced to two concurrent 25 year sentences); State v. Griffin, 744 P.2d 8, 9-10 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (defendant sentenced to 21 years); Brown v. Commonwealth, 818 S.W.2d
600, 600-01 (Ky. 1991) (defendant sentenced to 10 years).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion as to Parts I-iI;
majority opinion as to Part IV).
2 Id. at 961.
2'0 Id. (citing Michigan v. Hannelin, 440 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), leave to
appeal denied, 434 Mich. 863 (Mich. 1990) (reversing Harmelin's conviction initially
because evidence used at his trial was deemed to be in violation of the Michigan
Constitution)).
2" Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 80, leave to appeal denied, 434 Mich. 863 (Mich. 1990).
2-2 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
' Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-62 (1991) (plurality opinion as to Parts
I-Irn; majority opinion as to Part IV).
Id. at 996. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in all sections of Justice Scala's
opinion. Justice Kennedy, together with Justices O'Connor and Souter, concurred in the
judgment, but accepted Scalia's reasoning only with respect to mandatory punishment not,
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agreed that the obligation in capital cases for the sentencer to consider all
mitigating factors related to the crime and the offender does not apply to
non-capital sentences.3 5 Contrary to the defendant's assertion that, as
with capital punishment, life imprisonment without parole is a unique
sentence, the Court held that such a sentence is actually more similar to
other sentences of life imprisonment. 6  Therefore, according to a
majority of the Court, no special protection, such as the requirement to
consider mitigating factors, applies to sentences like that imposed on
Harmelin. 7 Unfortunately for courts that would have to wrestle with
proportionality challenges in the future, the members of the Court agreed
on little else.
Although five Justices agreed that Harmelin's sentence was not
grossly disproportionate to his crime and that the Court is not required to
take into account mitigating factors in non-capital cases, they dis-
agreed as to the specifics of the Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Scalia's
opinion, which construed both Anglo-American history and judicial
precedent as evidence of the fact that the Eighth Amendment contains no
prohibition on grossly disproportionate prison sentences.24
Justice Scalia took issue with the historical analysis performed by the
Court in Solem. Specifically, he rejected the notion advanced by the
Court in Solem that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
contained in the English Declaration of Rights had anything to do with
disproportionate punishments.24 Among other reasons for this, Justice
Scalia pointed to the fact that, although the drafters of the Declaration
were familiar with the concept of proportionality, they eschewed use of
the words "disproportionate" or "excessive" in favor of "cruel and
unusual," when describing forbidden punishments.242 Further, Scalia
argued, it is even more unlikely that the framers of the Eighth Amend-
in itself, being unconstitutional. Id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
," Id. at 995.
736 Id. at 996.
217 Id. at 995-96.
2' Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined in the
judgment given in Justice Scala's opinion. These same five Justices also agreed that there
was no requirement to consider mitigating factors except in capital cases. Id. at 960, 994.
" Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter disagreed with Justice Scalia's Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis. Id. at 996 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Scalia's
proportionality analysis can be found in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-85.
2' Id. at 961.
24 Id. at 966. See also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
242 Harinelin, 501 U.S. at 967.
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ment meant for the cruel and unusual clause to embody disproportion-
ality, both because of its wording and subsequent interpretation of the
clause.243
Turning next to previous holdings of the Supreme Court in this area,
Justice Scalia revisited the debate surrounding the Court's holding in
Weems that had occupied the Justices in both Rummel and Solem.2'
Justice Scalia conceded that language in the Weems opinion could support
the assertion that the sentence in that case was cruel and unusual due to
its length and independent of the mode of the cadena punishment24
Subsequent cases however, according to Scalia, evidence the fact that the
Court intended no such principle to emerge from Weems.2" At best,
concluded Scalia, the message of Weems regarding disproportionality
based on length of imprisonment alone is murky and should be no basis
to create a proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment in the
absence of explicit language.247
243 Id. at 975-85. This author confesses to sharing the viewpoint expressed in Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion that whether and to what extent we apply a standard of
proportionality should not depend on who "has the best of the historical argument." Id.
at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Court recognized in Trop v. Dulles that what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment embodies an "evolving sense of decency." Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). In Weems, the Court observed that
"[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910).
Clearly, cruelty meant different things to eighteenth century Americans than it does
to twentieth century Americans. By way of illustration, one member of our first Congress
said. "It is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and
perhaps having their ears cut off, but are we in [the] future to be prevented from inflicting
these punishments because they are cruel." 26 ANN. L. REV. 871, 875 n.41 (quoting 1
ANNALs OF CONG. 754 (Gates & Seton eds., 1789)).
It would seem preferable to rely on more contemporary assessments of what
constitutes cruel punishment. Radin, supra note 64, at 1033 (1978). See also Browning
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 264 n.4 (1989) (observing that the original meaning
of the Eighth Amendment has far more importance to questions involving the applicability
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause than it does to the scope of that clause)
(quoting from Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670-71 n.39 (1977)).
244 See supra notes 26-40 & 140 and accompanying text.
24 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990-94.
24 Id. at 992 (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (rejecting the
claim that a sentence of life imprisonment for a third offense for horse theft was cruel and
unusual)).
247 Id. at 992-94. Justice Scalia supported his view that Weems cannot be regarded as
an unequivocal bar to excessive punishments by noting that for over fifty years after that
decision, no Supreme Court case implemented such a prohibition.
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As the Court did in Rummel, Justice Scalia regarded previous
decisions that required proportionality assessments in capital cases to be
limited to only other capital cases!'4 He reasserted the view expressed
in Rummel that "[p]roportionality review is one of several respects in
which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections
that the Constitution nowhere else provides."249 However, if, as Justice
Scalia argued, there is no proportionality requirement in the language or
history of the Eighth Amendment, nor in early Supreme Court cases
applying the Amendment, from whence does even such a limited
proportionality principle emerge? Perhaps, as the Court suggested in Trop
v. Dulles, it comes from the recognition of the Eighth Amendment as an
evolving standarde' If it arises from the Eighth Amendment as
Coker"' and Enmund' 2 plainly hold, where is the explicit language
in the Amendment, its history or in early Supreme Court cases that
restricts such a requirement to capital cases only? It is particularly apt to
ask this of Justice Scalia, who asked these same questions of proponents
of a broader proportionality principle s
w Id. at 994 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
249 Id. at 994.
20 Trp v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion). The Court
reaffirmed this concept of the Eighth Amendment recently in Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The Court in Trop could be viewed as having recognized some form of
proportionality principle through negative implication when it wrote, "Since wartime
desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denational-
ization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime." Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. See also
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (citing Trop for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment bars
excessive punishments).
,-1 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
252 458 U.S. at 788.
25 Justice Scalia, in support of his assertion that the Eighth Amendment was not
intended to bar disproportionate punishment, noted that neither the Amendment itself nor
the English Declaration of Rights, from which the Eighth Amendment is said to derive,
explicitly refers to "disproportionate" or "excessive" punishments. Harnelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 966-67, 977 (1991) (plurality opinion with respect to this point). He
expressed doubt as to why the framers of each document would not use explicit terms that
were familiar to them had they actually intended to ban disproportionate punishments. Id.
at 977-79. Furthermore, he criticized Justice White's dissenting opinion in Harmelin,
which argued that the Eighth Amendment was intended to ban disproportionate
punishments, because Justice White chose what he regarded as a "reasonable" interpreta-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments rather than identifying "the most plausible"
meaning of the words. Id. at 976-77 n.6 (emphasis in original) (citing id. at 1010 (White,
J., dissenting)).
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In Justice Scalia's opinion, the only explanation for the Court's
limitation of proportionality review in capital cases requires acceptance
without analysis of the unsupported argument in Rummel that the reason-
ing in Coker and Enmund is limited to capital cases. In fact, neither
Coker nor Enmund specifically limited proportionality review to capital
cases. Significantly, in support of the existence of a proportionality
principle within the Eighth Amendment, the Court in Coker cited
Robinson, 5  Trop"6  and Weems, 7  all non-capital cases." Fur-
thermore, after enunciating the proportionality requirement in Coker, the
Court discussed how "[a] punishment might fail the test [of excessive-
ness]." 9 Nothing in that two part test suggests even indirectly that it
was meant to be limited to capital cases. 6
Justice Scalia believed that only one Supreme Court case clearly
identifying a principle of proportionality was directly on point: Solem v.
Helm. 6' As to Helm's elaboration of a proportionality principle, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Court was "simply wrong."262 According to
Justice Scalia, it was wrong regarding its explanation of the genesis of the
Eighth Amendment,263 wrong in its interpretation of Weems,2" and
wrong because it misread the holdings in Rummel and Davis."'
Accordingly, it is now fair to ask Justice Scalia the following: now that the Supreme
Court has indisputably identified a proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment
for capital cases, from what language in the Amendment could the requirement be
interpreted as limited to capital cases? Specifically, does "the most plausible" meaning
to be attached to the words of the Amendment contain such a limitation?
2 Id. at 993-94.
2' Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1985) (plurality opinion).
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
25 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592.
" Id. See also Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-99.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White observed, had
the Court construed the Eighth Amendment as limiting only the modes of punishment
without regard to the seriousness of the crime, it should have declared the death penalty
either to be cruel and unusual punishment for all crimes or for no crimes.
' Id. at 964-65 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
SId. at 965.
Id. at 965-83; see supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
2 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990-92; see supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
26 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965-83. The Court in Solem, according to Justice Scalia,
incorrectly interpreted Rummel and Davis by taking language out of context, see supra
notes 145-49 and accompanying text, by drawing conclusions unsupported by the
reasoning in those cases, and, at least once, by clearly ignoring a conclusion arrived at
in Rummel and affirmed in Davis. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965. As to the last point, Justice
Scalia, referring to Salem's adoption of the three criteria for assessing proportionality,
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In addition to rejecting the historical and jurisprudential foundations
for a proportionality principle, Justice Scalia addressed the wisdom of
employing such a principle in non-capital cases. He did this by examining
the three objectifying factors for assessing proportionality that were used
by the Court in Solem. Assessing the first factor, Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged that crimes of violence will always be deemed to be serious in
nature.2 The problem he identified involves determining what other
crimes are serious and assessing how serious they are compared to some
violent crimes.2" This determination, according to Justice Scalia, is
inherently subjective and not susceptible to objective analysis.26
The inability to assess objectively the seriousness of a crime, Scalia
reasoned, results as well in the failure of the second of Solem's objecti-
fying factors.269 This factor compares treatment of the offense in
question with that of other equally serious or more serious offenses in the
same jurisdiction.27 As one crime cannot be deemed to be objectively
more serious than another, according to Justice Scalia, it is fruitless to
look for other crimes to use as vehicles for comparison. To Justice Scalia,
differential treatment by a state of two arguably serious crimes merely
means that the legislature, for any of a number of appropriate reasons,
perceives greater danger in one type of serious crime than it does in
another." ' It is not the function of the courts in such situations, accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, to substitute their judgment for that of the duly
elected representatives of the people regarding which crime is more
serious.'
As for Helm's third objectifying factor, Justice Scalia conceded that
comparing how other states punish the crime at issue can be done with
"clarity and ease.""73 He contended, however, that such a comparison
has no bearing on an Eighth Amendment challenge. 7 Justice Scalia's
view, mirroring that expressed by the Court in Rummel, is that our
principles of federalism permit, if not encourage, such differential
wrote: "Davis had expressly, approvingly, and quite correctly described Rummel as having
'disapproved each of [the] objective factors."' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Hutto
v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (per curiam)).
m Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 987.2 7 Id.
2 Id. at 988. But see supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
20 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988-89.270 Id.
271 Id.
"' Id. But see infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
z Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989.
274 Id.
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treatment of crimes based on the different interests of the states in-
volved.275  Therefore, permitting different treatment of crimes by
individual states will inevitably result in a few states dealing with certain
crimes more harshly than others.276
Justice Scalia is correct in his observation that defining seriousness
involves a significant amount of subjectivity 2" and in his recognition
of the fact that a federalist system will inevitably result in disparate
treatment of crimes in different jurisdictions. Open to question, however,
is his conclusion that these observations negate the effectiveness of the
objectifying factors. While each of Scalia's points illustrates that no
precise calculus of what comprises a constitutional prison length can be
drawn from the objectifying factors, neither do they negate the ability of
the factors to point to sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
crimes committed.27
" Id. at 990 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 (1980)).
26 Id. at 989-90. But see infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
n The terms "cruel" and "unusual" themselves are rather imprecise, and any attempt
to interpret them necessarily involves some degree of subjectivity. Radin, supra note 64,
at 997.
2' "Gross disproportionality" is the standard for cruel and unusual punishment
identified in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996
(Kennedy, J., concurring), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983), Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion), Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667
(1977), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also Rummel,
445 U.S. at 271-72; and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (quoting
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
While it would be difficult to distinguish a harsh but proportionate sentence from one
that is somewhat disproportionate, a clearer, although still imprecise, line can be drawn
between tough but permissible sentences and those that far exceed acceptable norms. The
use of the three objectifying factors helps to accomplish this. For example, in the recent
case of Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1 (Md. 1993), the Maryland Court of Appeals
considered the defendant's challenge to sentences for two separate battery convictions. The
first battery involved what the court described as basically a slap, resulting in no real
injury. Id. at 7. The sentence of twenty years for this crime, the court held, was grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id. at 7-8. The second conviction resulted
from the defendant's hitting the victim with a steam iron three times, causing her to lose
consciousness, bleed profusely, and suffer an eight centimeter laceration. Id. at 9. The
court found the sentence of thirty years for this battery to be "harsh and severe" but not
grossly disproportionate. Id. at 10. This second sentence might have been found to be
somewhat disproportionate to the crime but was understandably left intact by the court.
While no precise line of gross disproportionality can be drawn, as Justice Scalia claimed,
a reasonable assessment of the seriousness of the first battery would lead to the
conclusion that the sentence for it crossed the line of Eighth Amendment acceptability.
It is better to struggle with drawing an admittedly imprecise line than to leave such an
unjust sentence intact.
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In attacking attempts to define seriousness, Justice Scalia alluded to
the various goals of sentencing that may lead a legislature to treat certain
crimes more harshly.279 He noted that proportionality is a term ground-
ed in the principle of retribution or just deserts."' While the notion that
the punishment should fit the crime is essential to the retributionist theory
of punishment, it is perfectly proper for a legislature to create a sentence
for a certain crime with deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation as
concerns. A focus on these other theories of punishment would necessari-
ly skew any proportion between crime and punishment, but still be
perfectly within the legislature's purview, according to Scalia.2"'
Notwithstanding the legislature's appropriate use of non-retributionist
theories of punishment, there are limitations on the ability of these
theories to justify grossly disproportionate sentences. If, as the Court held
in Solem (and seven Justices seem to hold in Harmelin),82 sentences
that are grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed violate the
Eighth Amendment, then the fact that such sentences serve to further
various sentencing goals cannot by itself insulate such sentences from
proportionality challenges. As the Court said in Rummel, although a state
may wish to deter overtime parking, it cannot do so by punishing such
behavior with a grossly excessive prison sentence.2 3 Similarly, while
certain offenders may be deemed incapable of being rehabilitated and
One needs only to recall the facts in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per
curiam), to see how use of the intrajurisdictional factor can be helpful in assessing gross
disproportionality. Davis was sentenced to forty years in prison based on his convictions
for possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana. Id. What makes clear the
gross disproportionality of this sentence beyond its facial harshness is the fact that Davis'
sentence was thirteen times greater than the average received by others convicted
contemporaneously in Virginia of the same types of crimes as Davis, and twenty-five
years longer than the next harshest sentence imposed for these crimes. Id. at 378 n.8
(Powell, J., concurring).
In United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1985), use of the other factor, a
comparison with sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions, helped the court
reach its conclusion that a sentence of nine years imprisonment for criminal contempt
violated the Eighth Amendment. In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit noted that no other federal court of appeals had ever aflined a sentence in excess
of five years imprisonment for criminal contempt. Id. at 990.
m Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989. He mentioned specifically the goals of deterrence and
rehabilitation. For a discussion of these punishment goals see infra notes 361-64, 376 and
accompanying text.
n' Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989. For a discussion of retribution see infra notes 365-70
and accompanying text.
t, Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989.
' See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
n Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288.
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requiring lengthy incapacitation, there is a limit on how long they can be
incarcerated if the sentence length is grossly disproportionate to the
offense committed."'
As with his discussion of the inability to define seriousness precisely,
Justice Scalia's argument that different states will inevitably punish a
given offense more harshly than others also ignores the point that too
much is too much. Justice Scalia's own example of federalism at work
serves to prove this point. To demonstrate his position, Justice Scalia
pointed to the fact that one state can legitimately choose to reward an act
that another chooses to punish. The example he offered is that of a state
that criminalizes the killing of an endangered animal while another state
offers a bounty for the same act! 5 The more apt situation to consider
when assessing gross disproportionality, however, is whether the first
state could sentence someone to decades of prison for killing the animal,
a term well beyond what other states impose.
Justice Scalia was able to garner the support of only one other
member of the Court for his approach to proportionality challenges under
the Eighth Amendment 86 Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and two
' One case demonstrating this is In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972). Lynch was
convicted of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor in California which called for a
punishment of up to six months incarceration. However, under a state law then in force,
a second indecent exposure conviction wananted an indeterminate sentence of one year
to life imprisonment. Id. at 922. The Supreme Court of California held this sentence as
applied to Lynch to be unconstitutionally excessive. Id.
After tracing a proportionality principle, based in part on excessiveness, through
Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil and the Supreme Court's holdings in Weems and Furman,
the California court turned next to how it would assess the validity of proportionality-
based claims. The court acknowledged that it was the legislature's province to consider
matters such as the "public will," "relevant policy factors," and sentencing goals and
strategies. However, it affinned the role of the judiciary in overturning sentences that are
severely disproportionate to the offense committed. Id. at 930. The crucial point is that
regardless of the claimed benefits to be achieved from any particular sentence, some type
of proportionality limitation is mandated by the ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
In Lynch's case, the court acknowledged that a second conviction for indecent
exposure increased the risk that the offender would commit the crime again, but asserted
that such a risk does not wan-ant a penalty so out of proportion to the offense committed.
Id. at 936-37. In analyzing the seriousness of the crime, how other second offenders are
treated in California, and how other states deal with similar situations, id. at 936-39, the
court found Lynch's sentence to be violative of at least California's cruel and unusual
punishment clause. Id. at 940. For a thorough critique of California's indeterminate
sentencing system, see JESSICA MrPoD, KiND AND USUAL PUNISHMm (1971).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989.
Id. at 961. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in all aspects of Justice Scalia's
opinion.
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other Justices, joined Scalia only in the judgment upholding Harnelin's
sentence. He also joined the portion of Scalia's opinion rejecting the
defendant's claim that his sentence was invalid because it was not
individualized.2
The opinion of Justice Kennedy is significant for a variety of reasons.
First, it makes clear that a majority of the Justices accept the existence of
at least some form of proportionality principle within the Eighth
Amendment for both capital and non-capital sentences."'8 Justice
Kennedy interpreted the opinions in Weems, 9 Rummel, Davis, 1
and even the dissenting opinion in Solem,' as upholding the existence
of such a principle. 3 While acknowledging that Solem takes a different
approach to application of proportionality principles than either Rummel
or Davis, Justice Kennedy recognized certain common threads running
through each of these cases. It is these common threads that he attempted
' Id. at 996. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter refused to join Scalia's opinion
as to the following: Scalia's conclusion, based on Anglo-American history and an analysis
of Supreme Court cases, that the Eighth Amendment, except for death penalty cases,
contains no bar to disproportionate sentences other than that created in Solem, id. at 961-
85; Scalia's assertion that Solem was wrongly decided and should be overruled, 1d. at 961;
and Scalia's blanket rejection of the three criteria for determining gross disproportionality,
id. at 986-90.
n' Justice Kennedy, explicitly opting to avoid the historical debate between Justices
White and Scalia, argued that "stare decisis counsels our adherence to the narrow
proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80
years." Id. at 996. Combined with the four dissenting Justices who argued strongly for the
existence of a proportionality principle, id. at 997 (White, J., joined by Blaclkmun and
Stevens, J.J., dissenting), id. at 1017 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Justices O'Connor and
Souter, who joined in Kennedy's opinion, this forms a solid majority of seven Justices
favoring some type of proportionality principle. Accord McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d
313, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 146 (1992) (affirning prisoner's conviction
and sentence under habitual offender statute); McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530,
535 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding a sentence of life without parole not cruel and unusual
punishment); Thomas v. State, 634 A.2d 1, 5 (Md. 1993) (holding that a 30 year sentence
imposed on a second count of common law battery does not violate the Eighth
Amendment). Differences clearly do exist among the Justices, however, over the breadth
of this principle and how best to apply it.
2" Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
2 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
291 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
29 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
2 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy seemed
to adopt the dubious reasoning in Solem, see supra notes 144.49 and accompanying text,
that both Rummel and Datis "recognized the possibility of proportionality review," but
refused to apply it to the facts of those cases. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998.
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to fashion into a framework for applying a proportionality requirement to
sentences.
According to Justice Kennedy, the first principle to be discerned from
previous cases is the need for courts to defer to legislative judgments
concerning what constitutes an appropriate sentence for a particular
crime 4 The issues of how and whether a state wishes to punish an
offense involve political determinations about the needs and interests of
the particular state as well as critical judgments as to what goals of
punishment are to be used and in what combination. To Kennedy, such
matters are fundamentally legislative in nature.2
5
The second principle Kennedy saw emerging from previous cases is
that legislatures are free to use any of a number of punishment theories
in structuring a sentencing system. 6 Further, according to Kennedy,
these theories can be applied in varying combinations and degrees by
both legislatures and sentencing courts. 7
Next, Kennedy determined that the Court, through its previous
holdings, had recognized that disparate treatment of the same crime by
different states was an inevitable byproduct of federalism. 8 Differences
regarding punishment of a particular offense are due to the variety of
philosophies and concerns that underlie each state's sentencing system. To
Justice Kennedy, this made any interstate sentencing comparison an
"imperfect enterprise." 9
The final principle Justice Kennedy extricated from the earlier cases
is the importance of relying on objective factors, where feasible, to assess
proportionality."'0 To Kennedy, the most important objective factor is
the type of punishment imposed. As the penalty of death has long been
viewed by the Court as unique, a clear line can be drawn between it and
a sentence involving jail time.30' Justice Kennedy, however, did not
discern such a clear line separating sentences involving shorter and longer
2' Hanmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910)).
" Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393
(1958)).
' The theories of punishment most frequently used are retribution, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and deterrence (both general and specific). See infra notes 353-71 and
accompanying text.
2" Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
- Id. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"0 Id. (Kennedy, 3., concurring).
30. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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periods of incarceration. The significance of this to Justice Kennedy is
that courts should be exceedingly reluctant to entertain proportionality
challenges to non-capital sentences.3"
Justice Kennedy began by comparing Harmelin's crime and sentence
to that of Helm."3 While Harmelin's sentence of life imprisonment
without parole was the second most serious that could be imposed, it was
the same sentence that Helm had received. However, Helm's wrongdoing,
even if it encompassed all of the crimes considered in his sentence as a
recidivist, was less serious than that of Harmelin, according to Kenne-
dy. 3" He defended this assertion by refuting Hannelin's contention that
his offenses, like Helm's, were nonviolent. To Justice Kennedy, drug
consumption, in addition to its effects on the user, may result in violent
crime (1) due to the physiological and psychological change it causes in
the user, (2) to provide funds to purchase drugs, or (3) as part of the drug
transaction. 5 Because of the potential danger in drug use and its
prevalence in society, Justice Kennedy concluded that Michigan's
admittedly harsh treatment of Harmelin could be viewed as an appropriate
attempt to achieve deterrence and retribution. Once such a determination
was made, Kennedy saw no reason to examine further whether the
sentence was excessive."6
Comparison of Harmelin's sentence to what he could have received
in other states and a look at how other serious offenses are treated in
Michigan, factors used by the Court in Solem, were deemed unnecessary
by Justice Kennedy.3"7 He did not read Solem as requiring use of the
comparative factors in every challenge to a sentence based on dispropor-
tionality. Instead, Kennedy saw the need for such comparisons only where
the Court first determined that the sentence was grossly disproportionate
to the seriousness of the crime. 0 ' In support of his approach, Justice
Kennedy noted that comparative analyses in both Weems and Solem were
undertaken only after determinations that the sentences were grossly
disproportionate to the crimes committed in each case.309 By contrast,
" Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
314 Id. (Kennedy, J., concun-ing).
305 Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3- Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3-6 Justice Kennedy concluded that while the Court in Solem used all three factors,
"it did not announce a rigid three-part test" for assessing all proportionality challenges.
Id. at 988-90 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
" Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 298-300
(1983); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377-81 (1910)).
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in both Rummel and Davis, cases in which the Court found no gross
disproportionality between sentence and crime, the Court rejected
attempts to use comparative analyses.31 Therefore, concluded Justice
Kennedy, comparative analysis should be employed only to confirm
initial determinations of gross disproportionality"'
It is noteworthy that Justice Kennedy avoided the historical debate
involving the antecedents of the Eighth Amendment. 12 Instead he
focused on more recent approaches to proportionality as evidenced in
twentieth century Supreme Court cases. The Eighth Amendment has long
been seen as an "evolving" set of principles. 3 Therefore, modem
proportionality approaches should not be governed by determinations
based on conflicting historical analyses of what principles were embodied
in the English Bill of Rights and to what degree they were adopted by the
framers. 3
14
The first three common threads that Justice Kennedy drew from
previous cases are similar to the points raised by Justice Scalia in his
opinion rejecting any proportionality requirement in non-capital cas-
es." 5 To Justice Kennedy, however, these principles, when combined
with his view of the Court's earlier recognition of some form of
proportionality requirement, lead to the conclusion that the Eighth
Amendment bans only those punishments that are grossly disproportionate
to the crime committed.16
Few would argue with Justice Kennedy's view of legislative primacy
in sentencing, the ability of each legislature to use various sentencing
theories in different combinations, or the inevitable result that some
jurisdictions will treat certain crimes more harshly than other jurisdic-
tions. Merely recognizing these principles, however, without acknowledg-
ing the important limits that attach to each, risks devaluing any propor-
tionality requirement and making its application less effective.
The Eighth Amendment was designed specifically to check legislative
excesses." 7 While legislatures establish punishment schemes, when a
310 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1980)).
311 Id. (Kennedy, 3., concurring).
317 Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
313 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion); see supra note 243.
314 See supra note 243.
35 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
316 Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288,
303 (1983)).
317 Referring to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court in Weems v.
United States declared:
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particular sentence is unconscionable, it is "not our discretion but our
duty" to interfere, as the Court said in Weems."' While a standard of
"gross disproportionality" will appropriately require less frequent judicial
intervention, when required, such intervention is crucial, in part, because
of its infrequency.
Although Justice Kennedy's attempt to harmonize the opinions of the
Supreme Court in previous proportionality cases may be somewhat more
persuasive than was Justice Powell's attempt to do so in Solem,"9 it
raises many questions as well Kennedy's conclusion that prior cases are
universal in their acceptance of a sentencing proportionality principle,
albeit a narrow one, is at least defensible. Cases such as Weems,
Robinson, Coker, and Solem seem to stand for such a principle,32 and
even Rummel and Davis could be said to leave the door slightly ajar to
a more limited proportionality principle.32' His assertion, however, that
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character
to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with
what accompaniments they might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could
be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that power might be
tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause.
217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910).
In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice
Brennan described Weems as having "recognized that this 'restraint upon legislatures'
possesses an 'expansive and vital character' that is 'essential... to the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual freedom."' Id. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Weems,
217 U.S. at 376-77). Later in his opinion Justice Brennan wrote: "Judicial enforcement
of the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by involdig the obvious truth that legislatures have
the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the reason the Clause
appears in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also the comments
of Holmes and Patrick Henry to their respective state conventions lamenting the fact that
no such limitation upon legislative punishments appeared in the Constitution prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights and why such a proscription was needed. Id. at 258-60
(citing respectively 2 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATES 111 and 3 J. ELLIOT's DEBATES 447 (2d ed.
1876)); Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY,
RETRIEUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 223 (1979)).
31. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982);
Furman, 408 U.S. at 267-8 (Brennan, J., concurring); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-
47 (1890); Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (asserting that
while legislatures have latitude in setting punishments for crimes, "there necessarily
remains a constitutional limitation upon the State's freedom to undertake even the most
enlightened and well motivated approaches to the most intractable and corrosive social
problems," and it falls to the courts to enforce this limitation).
See supra notes 137-49, 167-70, 205-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-40, 48, 62, 64, 136-65 and accompanying text.
121 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-74 & n.3 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 & n.1ll (1980).
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the use of two of the three proportionality criteria adopted by the Court
in Solem is discretionary is far less convincing. Justice Kennedy
purported to discern this discretion from the Court's language in Solem
regarding use of the two comparative factors.3' In Solem the Court said
"it may be helpful to compare sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction" and "the courts may find it useful" to engage in
interjurisdictional comparison.' To Justice Kennedy this meant that
courts may also decide that there is no need to engage in such compari-
sons where there is no clear gross disproportionality after assessing the
seriousness of the offense and harshness of the punishment." This
turned out to be a conclusion of some significance, since many courts
faced with challenges to the proportionality of a sentence after the
decision in Harmelin have adopted Justice Kennedy's approach."
Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the purportedly permissive
language in Solem is supported neither by other language in Solem, nor
by a more careful reading of the above-referred language itself. 6
Regarding the language in Solem cited by Kennedy, the Court appeared
to be saying that assessments of gross disproportionality are informed by
comparisons that show whether the sentence in question stands out from
others. If the challenged sentence stands out from others, then indeed the
comparisons may be "helpful" or "useful." After noting that intrajurisdic-
tional comparisons "may be helpful," the Court in Solem continued, "If
32 Hamelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (1991) (plurality opinion as to Parts
I-III; majority opinion as to Part IV).
"z' Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) (emphasis added).
'24 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
3ZI See United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hickey v.
United States, 115 S. Ct. 350 (1994); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2448 (1993); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313 (5th
Cir.), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1461 (1992); Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 91 (1992); United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 144 (1992); United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993); United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir.
1992); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1110 (1992); State v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d 823 (Ariz. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 511
(1993); State v. Sasak, 871 P.2d 729 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482
(Idaho 1992); State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. 1992); State v. Riley, 497 N.W.2d 23
(Neb. 1993); Downs v. Commonwealth, 616 A.2d 39 (Pa. 1992); State v. Gehrke, 491
N.W.2d 421 (S.D. 1992), denial ofpost-conviction relief aff'd by, Gehrke v. Lee, 56 F.3d
68 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Harris, 844 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Borrell, 482
N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1992).
3' Kelly A. Patch, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is Proportionate Sentencing Merely
Legislative Grace, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1697, 1716-18.
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more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be
excessive."' 7 Therefore, it appears that the Court in Solem is not
qualifying the need to conduct the comparative assessments, but merely
noting that the comparisons are "useful" or "helpful" in determining
disproportionality only when they show that the challenged sentence
stands out from others.32 Immediately following this discussion of the
benefits of using the three proportionality criteria, the Court in Solem
wrote: "In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria"32  and then
enumerated each of the three above criteria.33
Justice Kennedy further supported his limited use of the two
comparative proportionality analyses with his observation that such
analyses were performed in Weems and Solem only after the sentences
were deemed grossly excessive for relatively minor criminal activity. By
contrast Kennedy asserted, in Rummel and Davis, cases in which
sentences were not viewed as unduly excessive, the Court rejected
comparative analyses.3 ' The fact that the Court chose to examine the
harshness of the sentence and the seriousness of the crime prior to
engaging in comparative analyses in Weems and Solem hardly suggests,
as Kennedy asserted, that a clear finding of gross disproportionality is
required to even engage in such analyses. Instead it is more likely that the
Court recognized that it made little sense to compare a crime to others of
equal seriousness unless it was first determined how serious the crime at
issue was. Similarly, the rejection by the Court in Rummel and Davis of
327 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
" Similarly, regarding inteijurisdictional comparisons, the Court in Solem, after
saying such comparisons "may" be useful, gave examples of cases where the results of
interjurisdictional comparisons showed that the sentence at issue stood out from others.
Id. at 291-92 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380
(1910)).
' Solem, 463 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added).
3 The Court in Solem did not foreclose the possible use of additional objectifying
criteria as well. Id. Specifically, some have suggested the use of a fourth factor. first an
examination of local conditions and the legislative goals sought by specific punishment
statutes, and then an assessment of whether these goals are rationally related to the
sentence in question. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 983 (1974); Margaret R. Gibbs, Note, Eighth Amendment -Narrow Proportion-
alify Requirement Preserves Deference to Legislative Judgment, 82 J CRIM. L. &
CRmINOLOGY 955, 975-76 (1992).
" Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (plurality opinion as to Parts I-
III; majority opinion as to Part IV) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the comparative analyses hardly supports Kennedy's conditional use of
these comparisons, as both opinions rejected any judicial assessment of
the seriousness of the crime (Kennedy's favored criterion) as well. 32
Aside from its strained attempt at justification through synthesis of
earlier Supreme Court opinions, Justice Kennedy's conditional approach
to use of the comparative analyses criteria can be criticized for its lack
of efficacy as well. As Justice Kennedy noted, one clear principle that
emerges from the Court's previous holdings on proportionality is that
judicial determinations of the excessiveness of a sentence should not be
nor appear to be merely the individual predilections of the judges
involved.3 The exclusive use of the harshness of the crime criteria
(even if this one-criteria approach is used only when there appears to be
no gross disproportionality between crime and sentence) runs counter to
this principle. As Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Harmelin, it is far more subjective to base proportionality determinations
on merely the view of the deciding judges regarding the seriousness of
the crime than it is to have their judgment informed by the way in which
the state treats other criminals and how other states deal with the crime
at issue." Therefore, while Justice Kennedy was certainly correct in
noting that comparative analysis may be "an imperfect enterprise," this
type of analysis is still an informative and objectifying one.335
332 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). In fact, the criterion that examines the seriousness
of the crime was the first one rejected by the Court in both Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 275-76 (1980), and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 n.2 (1982) (per curiam).
33 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at
290 ('[C]ourts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have recognized");
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (quoting
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)) ("Eighth Amendment judgments should not
be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices .... "); Enmund,
458 U.S. at 788 ("[O]ur judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent."). See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 79
(1973) ("[T]he power to send people to prison for long stretches ought to be exercised in
a system of law on grounds more objective and rational than vague sentiment:').
3 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting) ("[O]nly when a comparison
is made with penalties for other crimes and in other jurisdictions can a court begin to
make an objective assessment about a given sentence's constitutional proportionality
..."). See also Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprison-
ment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1136 (1979); Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 55-56;
Allyn G. Heald, Note, U.S. v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningfid Proportionality
Principle, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 455, 491 (1992); Mark Alden James, Note, Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Analysis: The Limits of Moral Inquiry, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 871,
879 (1984).
" When assessing the seriousness of Hannelin's crime, Justice Kennedy apparently
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The problem in using only the seriousness of the crime criterion is
illustrated by a look at how Kennedy applies his proportionality approach
to Harmelin's crime. A comparison with Justice White's application of all
three criteria in his dissent evidences a reasonable difference of opinion
regarding the seriousness of possessing over 650 grams of cocaine.
Although Kennedy regarded the sentence of life without parole as harsh,
he argued that Michigan has the right to determine that the goal of
deterring possession of large amounts of cocaine warrants such a
sentence." 6 He rejected Harmelin's claim that drug possession should
be regarded as a victimless crime, and described how the effects of drugs
harm not only the user, but society as well. 37 Specifically, Justice
Kennedy called attention to the connection between drug use and the
commission of violent crime.338
Justice White, in his dissent, conceded that the use of drugs is
serious, 39 but not so serious as sale or possession with intent to sell,
neither of which Harmelin was convicted." White compared the
collateral consequences of drugs, a factor upon which Justice Kennedy
appeared to rely heavily, to those of alcoholY Such consequences,
White asserted, could lead to penalties, but not to oppressively harsh
ones3M2 Furthermore, in a state such as Michigan, where there is no
capital punishment, life imprisonment is the harshest punishment
possible. 3 To apply such a harsh punishment mandatorily, without
regard to the fact that Harmelin was a first offender and without any
suggestion that Harmelin's particular offense was especially egregious, is
even more problematic for Justice White.'
did find it useful, however, to compare the nature of that crime with those committed by
Helm. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
336 Id. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also referred to the penolo-
gical goal of retribution as a possible justification for Harmelin's sentence.
317 Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concuning).
I' Id. at 1002-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy saw this connection
occurring in three possible ways: (1) the drg-induced state of the offender leads him to
violent crime, (2) the drug user to obtain money for drugs may resort to criminal activity
(i.e., robbery or burglary), and (3) violent crime is often endemic to the business of
selling drugs. Id. (citing Goldstein, Drugs and Violent Crime, in PATHWAYS TO CRIMINAL
VIOLENCE 16, 24-36 (N. Weiner & M. Wolfgang eds., 1989)).
33 Id. at 1022 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting).
341 Id. at 1023-24 (White, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 1022 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1025-26 (White, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting).
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In sum, Justice Kennedy and the two Justices who joined in his
opinion viewed Harmelin's crime as more serious than did Justice White
and the three other Justices who joined with him." Further, the views
of both groups of Justices seem to be reasonable. Under Justice Kenne-
dy's approach, once the determination is made that no gross dispropor-
tionality exists based on an assessment of the seriousness of the crime,
analysis stops. In such a situation the subjective views of the judges
would appear to be not just a factor in the decision, but the determining
factor." It would be wiser to turn, as did Justice White, to the two
comparative analyses to inform any determination of gross dispropor-
tionality. 7
In so doing, Justice White observed that Michigan's harshest penalty
is reserved for only two other crimes, both of which are surely more
serious than drug possession.' Furthermore, arguably more serious
crimes against the person, such as murder in the second degree and armed
robbery, do not carry mandatory life sentences. 9 It is also significant,
11 Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in Justice White's dissenting opinion. Id. at
1009. Justice Marshall dissented separately, but noted that, except for the comments on
capital punishment in Justice White's opinion, he was entirely in agreement with White's
opinion. Id. at 1027-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3" It should be understood that in applying terms such as "cruer' and "unusual,"
complete objectivity can never be attained. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 26, at 59
(asserting that the Eighth Amendment was "designed to preserve human dignity not
objective science"); Joshua Dressier, Proportionality and Justice as Endangered
Doctrines, 34 SW. L.J. 1063, 1104-06 (1981); Note, The Supreme Court's 1979 Term, 94
HARV. L. REV. 75, 96 (1980); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)
(observing that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "admits of few absolute
limitations," and reaffinming that interpretations of the Clause should utilize our
"evolving sense of decency") (quoting from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
Perhaps the best means of describing the purpose of the three-factor approach for
proportionality determinations is not to view it as a pretense of pure objectivity, but
instead as "an effort to gauge tangible reflection of the common mind." Baker & Baldwin,
supra note 26, at 61.
3" See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting). Those two crimes are first degree murder and
manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or distribute 650 grams
or more of narcotics. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White found it disturbing that Michigan chose not to prosecute Harnelin
under the more serious crime of possession with intent to distribute, because it knew it
could obtain the same sentence without having to prove the additional element of intent.
To Justice White, this meant that the state essentially obtained for Harmelin the sentence
warranted for the more serious crime, while having to prove only the less serious one. Id.
at 1025 (White, J., dissenting).
" Id. (White, J., dissenting). To Justice White this demonstrated that Harmelin had
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according to Justice White, that Michigan is the only state in which a
defendant could receive life without parole for possessing the amount of
drugs Harmelin had.35 While this is certainly permissible under our
federalist system, the fact that Michigan treats Harmelin differently than
would any other state informs an assessment of proportionality and even
more obviously objectifies the assessment measurably.35'
In the wake of the holding by the Supreme Court in Harmelin,
following the decisions in Rummel, Davis, and Solem, a great deal of
confusion exists respecting the application of a proportionality principle
to non-capital sentences. 2 Much of that confusion stems from the
been treated at least as harshly, if not more so, than those in Michigan guilty of having
committed more serious crimes. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
" Specifically, Justice White noted that only one other state, Alabama, punishes a
first-time drug possessor with life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and even
there such punishment results only from possession of an amount considerably greater
than that possessed by Harmelin. Additionally, according to Justice White, Harmelin
would have received approximately ten years in prison under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Id. at 1026-27 (White, J., dissenting).
351 In determining the acceptability under the Eighth Amendment of Georgia's capital
sentencing provision for offenders convicted of the rape of an adult woman, the Court in
Coker examined at some length the capital sentencing provisions in other states. Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion). It concluded- "The current
judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state
legislatures but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman." Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
The Court in Coker also alluded to the fact that one year earlier, when it had approved
other aspects of Georgia's capital sentencing provisions in Gregg, it was heavily
influenced by similar policies in other states. Id. at 592 ("[A]ttention must be given to the
public attitudes concerning a particular sentence history and precedent, legislative
attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be
consulted."); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (plurality opinion)
(discussing how international opinion regarding the acceptability of a punishment
(denationalization) played a role in the Court's opinion), cited in Coker, 433 U.S. at 596
3.10.
3.2 A number of lower courts refer to this confusion directly. See United States v.
Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1993) (observing that "[t]he Supreme Court has not
provided clear guidance regarding the propriety or nature of proportionality review innon-
capital cases," and also noting the "lack of clear directive from the Supreme Court"
regarding Eighth Amendment proportionality claims); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7
F.3d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1563 (1994) (noting that the
Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus on the existence, or lack thereof, of
proportionality review in Harmelin, and stating that "Harmelin provides no guidance in
articulating the proper approach for an Eighth Amendment review."); Neal v. Grammer,
975 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The future of the proportionality test is uncertain.");
People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 34 n.10 (Colo. 1992) ("Harmelin leaves the future of
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inability of the Justices to agree upon and articulate clearly an Eighth
Amendment proportionality principle, and from the mixed signals they
have given with respect to application of such a principle. These
problems derive in large part from the Court's failure to develop a
convincing philosophical basis on which to premise a meaningful ban on
grossly disproportionate punishments.
V. PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Any attempt by the Court to resolve issues surrounding the concept
of proportionality should be informed by both long-held and modem
ideas related to theories of punishment. Theories of punishment are
traditionally divided into two somewhat competing justifications:
retribution and utilitarianism." Retribution, or just deserts, seeks to
Solem somewhat clouded." (citation omitted)); Bult v. Leapley, 507 N.W.2d 325, 328 n.2
(S.D. 1993), appeal after remand, State v. Bult, 529 N.W.2d 197 (S.D. 1995) (deciding
the case on other than proportionality grounds, the court stated, "Whether the Eighth
Amendment even encompasses a proportionality principle in non-capital cases has been
called into question .. ." and citing Harmelin as the source of the confusion.); State v.
Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Wis. 1992) ("[A] recent decision of the Supreme Court
casts serious doubt on the viability of proportionality analysis in non-death penalty
cases.").
Others demonstrate this confusion by holding that Solem was overruled by Harmelin.
See People v. Knott, 586 N.E.2d 479, 497 (III. App. Ct. 1991), vacated due to death of
defendant, 621 N.E.2d 611 (1993) ("Solem was expressly overruled in Harmelin" and
"the term 'cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment has no connection to the
particular offense."); State v. Tyler, 840 P.2d 413, 434 (Kan. 1992) (viewing Harmelin
as overruling Solem); State v. Combs, 504 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that Harmelin did away with proportionality review); State v. Stoer, 862 S.W.2d
348, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Solem was "expressly overruled" by Harmelin
and that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality requirement). These
courts saw no proportionality requirement after Harmelin, notwithstanding the stance
seven Justices took in support of some kind of proportionality principle. See supra note
288 and accompanying text.
Even among those courts that saw a proportionality principle surviving Harmelin,
there is disagreement on how to apply it. Compare cases cited, supra note 325 (requiring
use of the inter- and intrajurisdictional comparative criteria only after an initial
determination of gross disproportionality is made), with those courts that continue to
require application of the three criteria in all cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lemons,
941 F.2d 309, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1991); People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 34 n.10 (Colo.
1992) ("In absence of more definitive guidance from the United States Supreme Court,
we shall adhere to our prior understanding of the requirements of Solem"); Johnson v.
State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 177-78 (Wyo. 1992).
" MURPHY, supra note 317, at 151; PAcKER, supra note 200, at 10-11; LEoN
RADZINOWvICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CUms 115 (1966).
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punish an offender for the act committed commensurate with the
harm inflicted and the moral wrongfulness of the act. 5 Retribution is
retrospective in that it punishes for what was done without any regard to
possible future benefits arising out of the punishment.35
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is prospective in that its goal is to
impose a punishment that will be beneficial to society in the future.3"
That intended benefit usually takes the form of deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation or some combination thereof."' Utilitarians believe that
it is without effect, and therefore cruel, to impose punishment on an
offender merely because a moral wrong was committed. 9  Jeremy
Bentham, perhaps the leading early proponent of utilitarianism, believed
that "punishment is a technique of social control which is justified so
long as it prevents more mischief than it produces. 360
As did Bentham, modem utilitarians have particularly championed the
principle of general deterrence to justify the imposition of punish-
314 See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SEmvicE COMMITTE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 147-
48 (1971), arguing that as a matter of principle, the law has dominion over an offender
only as to the criminal act committed. As a matter of policy, were the law to sentence
"the whole person," then irrelevant and improper considerations such as wealth, influence
and power would inevitably play a role in sentencing, according to the authors. Id.
351 VON HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 31, 64. von Hirsch defines harm as "the injury
done or risked by the criminal act." in assessing wrongfulness or culpability, he looks to
"the factors of intent, motive and circumstance." Id. at 64. See also Baker & Baldwin,
supra note 26, at 69 (including the following among factors of blameworthiness: the harm
to persons and property; whether the misconduct was intentional or negligent; whether the
harm actually occurred or was merely threatened; what the risk was; and how much
violence or theft occurred); Gilchrist, supra note 334, at 1125.
3M MUPHY, supra note 317, at 229; PACKER, supra note 200, at 11; RADziNOwIcz,
supra note 353, at 115; VON HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 31; Radin, supra note 64, at
1049.
317 PACKER, supra note 200, at 11, 14; RADZINOWICz, supra note 353, at 115; Radin,
supra note 64, at 1049.
358 C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT 7-8 (1987).
311 Utilitarians believe "suffering is always an evil and there is no justification for
making people suffer unless some secular good can be shown to flow from doing so."
PACKER, supra note 200, at 11. To utilitarians, sentencing based on retributionist notions
of public indignation or condemnation is counterproductive, in part because it makes the
judge less likely to consider the effects of the sentence on the community at large. H.L.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILTY 170-71 (1968). Understandably, therefore,
utilitarian goals are described as "collectivist," whereas retributive goals are classified as
"individualist." Radin, supra note 64, at 1049.
" Stanley I. Benn & Richard S. Peters, The Utilitarian Case for Punishment, in
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT 96, 96 (Rudolph I Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds.,
1972).
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ment.61 Stated simply, proponents of general deterrence advocate
sentencing an offender just severely enough to create a significant
disincentive for other similarly situated potential offenders to avoid
engaging in criminal activity? The concept of general deterrence
presupposes that crime is a rational act and that the potential offender will
weigh rationally the cost (likelihood of conviction and punishment
imposed) against the possible benefits to be achieved from the criminal
act. 63 Further, it assumes communication, in some form, of sentences
actually imposed to potential future offenders.3"
Although they share the view that crime is the product of a rational
act, 5 strict retributionists recoil from the supposed pragmatism of
" See generally PACKER, supra note 200; Andenaes, supra note 200, at 949; Bern
& Peters, supra note 360, at 97-98. General deterrence should be distinguished from the
separate, but related, punishment justification known as special or specific deterrence.
Special deterrence proponents advocate punishing the individual to the extent necessary
to prevent or reduce the likelihood that she will commit another crime in the future.
While similar to general deterrence in that it is based on the rational, hedonistic model
of criminal behavior, special deterrence aims at detening the particular offender rather
than other similarly situated potential offenders. See PACKER, supra note 200, at 45-46.
2 PACKER, supra note 200, at 140; RADZINOWICZ, sura note 353, at 10-11; VON
HIRscH, supra note 172, at 32.
313 PACKER, supra note 200, at 11, 40-41.
Hart describes how proponents of general deterrence seek to work "through the
mind" of those who are to be deterred.
These thinkers conceived the law's threats of punishment as something which
would enter into the reasoning and deliberation of the potential criminal at the
moment when he considered whether or not to commit the crime: the threats
were to constitute, for the person tempted to commit the crime, reasons against
committing it, and the hope was that the reasons would appear conclusive and
lead to a decision to conform. In this rationalistic picture of what one might call
"criminal deliberations", the threat of punishment was intended to constitute a
guide to deliberation on the assumption that he would be tempted to commit the
crime and he would deliberate.
HART, supra note 359, at 133.
3 Andenaes, supra note 200, at 970.
3 Professor Jeffrie Murphy describes the retributionist's approach to the criminal as
a rational actor as follows: "If he chooses not to sacrifice by exercising self-restraint and
obedience, this is tantamount to his choosing to sacrifice in another way - namely by
paying the prescribed penalty." JEFFPRiE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUION RECONSIDERED 47
(1992) (quoting JEFPRiE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RiGHT 142-43 (1970)).
The criminal, therefore, deserves the punishment he receives because he is morally
responsible for his actions. To the retributionist, moral responsibility justifies infliction
of punishment. TEN, supra note 358, at 46-48.
The "liberal" or "classical" approach to crime, whose most renowned proponent was
Cesare Beccaria, had aspects of both retribution and deterrence. As Beccaria believed that
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general deterrence, often sharing the view of Immanuel Kant, that "one
man ought never to be dealt with as a means subservient to the purpose
of another ... ."' To Kant and his many followers, the purpose of
punishment is to act as an appropriate, morally justified, societal response
to a moral or legal wrong." When considering the extent of punish-
ment, the focus is on the act more than the actor, and certainly not on
any potential offender." If fortuitously society derives certain benefits
from the sentence such as deterring potential criminals or furthering the
rehabilitation of the defendant, that is all well and good.369 The goal of
punishment to the retributionist, however, must be some form of righting
the wrong, and not "the serpent-wings of utilitarianism." "'
Most Western penal systems combine in varying degrees retributionist
and utilitarian theories of punishment.7 In crafting its approach to
proportionality within the "evolving standard" of the Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court should take note of both justifications for punishment
crime was the product of a rational act, both deterrence and retribution were appropriate
punishment justifications. RADZINOWlCZ, supra note 353, at 12-13. By contrast, those with
a "behavioral" view of crime see free will as an illusion and ascribe criminal conduct to
a variety of anatomical, psychological, economic, or environmental factors. PACKER,
supra note 200, at 11-13.
3 Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, Part H (W. Hastie trans., 1887), 194-98,
reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 103, 104 (Gertrude Ezorzky
ed., 1972). When a person is so treated, according to C.S. Lewis, he or she loses his or
her autonomy and becomes a "case." C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of
Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMET, supra note 360, at 195.
367 See generally HART, supra note 359, at 236; PACKER, supra note 200, at 9-10; J.D.
Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939).
3a Helen Silving, A New Philosophy of Criminal Justice, in CONTEMPORARY
PUNISHMENT, supra note 360, at 254.
30 PACKER, supra note 200, at 10.
" WALKER, supra note 172, at 7.
37 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 353, at 115. See also Jerome Hall, The Inclusive Theory
of Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 360, at 235-36. In our
country, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provided for the development of sentencing
guidelines for the federal courts that would "fbrther the basic purposes of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment and rehabilitation." UNrIED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (1994). The guidelines were
to aim at achieving all of these goals, although the basic objective of the Act was "to
combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system." Id. at 2. The Senate Judiciary
Committee reported that the guidelines were "designed to structure judicial sentencing
discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole release and make criminal
sentences fairer and more certain." S. Rep. No. 223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1983). The
call for "fair" and "certain!' sentencing through a guidelines approach suggests that the
actual primary goal of the Act is retribution through proportioning the sentence to the
crime.
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and, particularly, the way in which each addresses the issue of proportion-
ing the sentence to the crime.
It is hardly surprising that retributionists have an overriding concern
with proportioning the severity of a sentence to the crime committed,
given that theories of desert and proportionality are based on the same
underpinnings." To the retributionist, a person should receive the
punishment he or she deserves based on the wrongfulness of the act
committed and the extent of the harm inflicted." While different
retributionists define wrongfulness in different ways, they share the view
that a firm relationship between crime and punishment, based on desert,
is essential to insure justice in any sentencing system. 74 As justice, and
not any utilitarian benefit, is the ultimate goal of the retnbutionist,"
it follows that the punishment must be proportionate to the crime.
Somewhat less self-evident is the view among all but the most
extreme utilitarians that principles of proportionality play an important
role in punishment theory.Y To some utilitarians, a ban on punish-
ments that are grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed serves as
'3 See, e.g., C.S. Lewis, who argues that "the concept of desert is the only connecting
link between punishment and justice." Lewis, supra note 366, at 195.
" See supra note 355 and accompanying text. Hart attributes to all strict retribution-
ists the view that punishing someone, appropriate to the wickedness of the offense, is a
mandatory component of any just system. HART, supra note 359, at 231.
3-4 See, e.g., K.G. Armstrong, The Right to Punish, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PUNISHMENT 136, 136 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972); MURPHY, supra note 365, at 60;
VO HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 38; Lewis, supra note 366, at 195.
37' Herbert Morris suggests that the wrongfulness of basing punishment on achieving
utilitarian ends can be demonstrated by considering a situation in which a person innocent
of any crime receives a criminal sentence. Even if deterrence or some other utilitarian end
can be achieved through such a sentence, it is still patently unjust. Sentences that are
excessive and disproportionate to the crime committed to achieve utilitarian ends, Morris
argues, constitute similar scapegoating. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIES, supra note 374, at 121. See generally NORVAL MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OP IMPRISONMENT 75 (1972); MURPHY, supra note 317, at 234.
37' HART, supra note 359, at 76; PACKER, supra note 200, at 16; Andenaes, supra note
200, at 957, 970.
To extreme utilitarians, especially those characterized as behavioralists, see PACKER,
supra note 200, at 11-13, widely indeterminate and therefore disproportional sentences
are acceptable. Such sentences leave open the amount of imprisonment an offender must
serve until it is determined whether she is sufficiently "rehabilitated" to be released. Id.
at 14. Proponents of such sentences often are positivists who view crime as less the
product of a free will than as the manifestation of a sickness. For a discussion of the
concept of crime as a sickness, see KARL MENNInGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT
(1966). For criticism of the extreme indeterminate sentencing system employed by
California in the 1960s, see MrTORD, supra note 284, at 87-103.
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a necessary limit so that sentences will not be overly severe."r To
others, using the language of utilitarianism, sentences that are excessive
are not useful. H.L.A. Hart, for instance, maintained that like cases be
treated alike and different cases differently (an important aspect of
proportionality), but not, as a retributionist would argue, so that society
can express a level of moral indignation appropriate to the crime." 8
Instead, Hart saw the need to establish "a prima facie principle of fairness
between offenders."379 Achieving this fairness was not an end in itself
(as it might be for a remibutionist),"0 but rather a means of furthering
some forward-looking aim such as deterrence or rehabilitation. At least
one utilitarian explains this connection between fairness and utilitarianism
in the following way- when a penalty for a certain crime is too severe,
the public is less likely to inform the police, prosecutors are not as likely
to prosecute fully and the jury is less inclined to convict.38" ' Given this
diminution in enforcement of the law, no meaningful utilitarian benefit,
such as general deterrence, can occur.
Bentham's approach to proportionality is summed up in his belief that
punishing someone more than is necessary, even to achieve desirable
goals, is "evil without justification.' '3" Although this focus on utilitarian
necessity is not the same thing as proportionality between punishment and
crime, it is a recognition of the importance of punishment limitation.8 3
Further, along with classical punishment theorist Cesare Beccaria,
Bentham realized that if crimes of unequal gravity were punished equally,
the public would lose the important ability to distinguish serious wrongs
from more trivial ones."
" Andenaes, supra note 200, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT 112 (Rudolph J.
Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
37 HART, supra note 359, at 170-72.
37 Id. at 172-73.
380 HART, supra note 359, at 233-37; MuRPHY, supra note 317, at 235.
311 Andenaes, supra note 200, at 970.
32 WALKER, supra note 172, at 103. See also MUnPHY, supra note 317, at 226;
Radin, supra note 64, at 1045 (defining a cruel act as one that "gratuitously inflicts
suffering or inflicts suffering without good reason").
383 Packer claims that a modem day Benthamite would allow just enough punishment
to accomplish the goal of deterrence. PACKER, supra note 200, at 140. Hart argues that
treating trivial offenses with severity inflicts greater suffering than it is likely to prevent,
and therefore violates utilitarian principles. HART, supra note 359, at 173 n.20.
314 WALKER, supra note 172, at 103-04. Although Hart rejects the view of strict
retributionists that each crime has a different moral price tag attached to it, he does hold
that:
[M]aintenance of proportion of this kind may be important: for where the legal
gradation of crimes expressed in the relative severity of penalties diverges
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VI. LIMIrrNG RETRIBUTIVISM
There is therefore a recognition by both schools of punishment theory
that some sort of ban on grossly disproportionate sentences is necessary.
Although each school comes to this conclusion by different means,
consistent with its particular views on why punishment is justified, such
a consensus should inform the Supreme Court's approach to proportionali-
ty. Specifically, the Court should adopt an approach of "limiting
retributivism" in its decisions assessing proportionality under the Eighth
Amendment."5 This approach would allow both legislatures and trial
judges to use whatever retributive and utilitarian goals they thought
justified when setting punishments. It would, however, place a limit on
the severity of the sentences consistent with the notion that no sentence
can be grossly disproportional to the crime which it seeks to punish."C
sharply from this rough scale, there is a risk of either confusing common
morality or flouting it and bringing the law into contempt.
HART, supra note 359, at 25.
When the public has contempt for the law, achievement of utilitarian ends, such as
deterrence, is virtually impossible.
3" Norval Morris describes limiting retributivism in this way:
Desert is not a defining principle; it is a limiting principle. The concept of "just
desert" sets the maximum and minimum of the sentence that may be imposed
for any offense and helps to define the punishment relationships between
offenses; it does not give any more fine-tuning to the appropriate sentence than
that. The fine-tuning is to be done on utilitarian principles.
NORvAL MoRRis, MADNESS AND THE CRMIAL LAw 199 (1982).
Nigel Walker, after describing limiting retributivism in similar terms, observes that
most British penal statutes are based on the principle of "retribution not as duty but
merely as a rule that sets upper limits to the severity of punishment." WALKER, supra
note 172, at 127. Packer argues that while prevention or deterrence is the chief purpose
of the criminal law, blameworthiness must act as a limiting principle. PACKER, supra note
200, at 66. See also Armstrong, supra note 374, at 136.
These commentators are describing limiting retributivism as the foundation for a
sentencing system, not specifically as a standard or guide for application of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. To turn limiting retributivism into a workable and
principled constitutional standard, this author would advocate imposing a desert-based
maximum, yet allowing states to use whatever combination of utilitarian or retributionist
punishment goals they choose in framing sentences.
3" As Professor Murphy observed: "Considerations of justice fumction as checks on
social utility, weighing against promoting happiness if in so doing some people must be
treated unfairly in the process." MURPHY, supra note 317, at 150.
Naturally, once a maximum is set, there is no need to sentence every defendant to
that maximum. Nigel Walker, Varieties ofRetributivism, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT,
supra note 360, at 89. At this point both utilitarian and desert principles can help inform
what constitutes the proper sentence. Norval Morris, for example, advocates use of the
[Vol 84
1995-96] NON-CAPIAL SENTENCING
Limiting retributivism recognizes "the tendency of all conduct codes
... to proportion to some extent the severity of the group's reaction to a
violator, i.e. the punishment, to the severity of injury done to its moral
values."3'  Additionally, it realizes that utilitarian goals such as deter-
rence, incapacitation or rehabilitation can be worthwhile sentencing
considerations. It is, however, most difficult to assess whether a particular
criminal justice system is effective at achieving any of these utilitarian
goals."' Given this uncertainty, creating a sentencing system based
entirely on achieving these goals without desert limitations risks causing
severe injustice without the certainty of tangible benefits." 9
Perhaps most importantly, limiting retributivism, as an Eighth
Amendment approach, although using desert as an outside limit, allows
legislatures and sentencing judges the latitude to use primarily utilitarian
considerations, primarily retributionist considerations, or some combina-
concept of parsimony, whereby the sentence could be "[t]he least restrictive - least
punitive - sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes." MORRIS, supra note
375, at 60-61. By condemning punishment that "makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering," the lead opinion in Coker appears to take
cognizance of the parsimony principle. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion of White, J.). For a detailed discussion of this aspect of the opinion in
Coker, see Radin, supra note 64, at 1052-54.
" Sellin, The Law and Some Aspects of Criminal Conduct, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS
AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 121 (1957), quoted in Jerome Hall, Just vs. Unjust
Law, in CONTEMORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 360, at 53 n19. See also EMILE
DuRKHEIM THE RUiS OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 73 (George E. Catlin ed. & Sarah A.
Solovay & John H. Mueller trans., 1938), quoted in Jerome Hall, Just vs. Unjust Law, in
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 360, at 235-36; Hall, supra note 371, at 235-
36.
39, RADZINOWICZ, supra note 353, at 120-21; VON HRscH, supra note 172, at 95;
WALKER, supra note 172, at 67; Silving, supra note 368, at 254 ("[S]ince we do not
know how either deterrence or rehabilitation works, these cannot be assumed as primary
goals ... ").
399 WALKER, supra note 172, at 67. C.S. Lewis fears that the claims of experts
regarding the benefits of unlimited utilitarian approaches to sentencing will have the
following effect:
Only the expert "penologist' .. in the light of previous experiment, can tell
us what is likely to deter only the psychotherapist can tell us what is likely to
cure. It will be in vain for the rest of us, speaking simply as men, to say, "but
this punishment is hideously unjust, hideously disproportionate to the criminal's
deserts." The experts with perfect logic will reply, "but nobody was talking
about deserts." No one was talking about punishment in your archaic vindictive
sense of the word. Here are the statistics proving this treatment deters. Here are
the statistics proving that this other treatment cures. What is your trouble?
Lewis, supra note 366, at 196.
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tion of the two." ° It does not turn the Eighth Amendment into a docu-
ment compelling the use of any particular sentencing theory and is
sensitive to concerns of federalism. Accordingly, even future-oriented
utilitarians who see crime prevention as the central element of any system
of punishment, such as Hart 91 or Packer,392 accept the need for a
desert-based maximum. Similarly, scholars more commonly associated
with a desert-based approach to punishment, such as Andrew von
Hirsch,393 are willing to permit the use of utilitarian considerations as
long as some sort of proportionality limitation exists. 4
While an Eighth Amendment standard based on limiting retributivism
might on rare occasions serve to overturn a short prison sentence, 95 its
primary impact would be to restrict longer sentences whose disproportion-
ality stems from attempts to achieve utilitarian ends. 6
"' See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 365, at 21-22.
391 HART, supra note 359, at 172-73.
39 PACKER, supra note 200, at 66.
30 VON HIRSCH, supra note 172, at 43-46. But note von Hirsch's distinction between
ordinal magnitudes, for which he sees desert principles as determining the sentence, and
cardinal magnitudes, for which he sees such principles as only limiting the sentence, von
Hirsch defines ordinal magnitudes as those factors dealing with "how crimes should be
punished related to each other," and cardinal magnitudes as those concerned with
determining "what absolute levels of severity should be chosen to anchor the penalty
scale." Id. at 39.
39 Hart observes that, "many self-styled retributionists treat appropriateness to the
crime as setting a maximum within which penalties, judged most likely to prevent the
repetition of the crime by the offender or others, are to be chosen." HART, supra note
359, at 237. See also WALKER, supra note 172, at 127; Gilchrist, supra note 334, at
1123.
3.1 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (ninety days in jail
excessive for "crime" of being a drug addict); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962) (placing prisoner in restrictive custody apart from general population for
two years for racist preaching constitutes unreasonable punishment).
3 RADZINOWICZ, supra note 353, at 127.
See Gilchrist, supra note 334, at 1126 n.32 (expressing the fear that absent some
desert-based limitation, a person, because of his or her unpopularity could receive a long
jail sentence for a relatively minor crime) (citing, for example, Johnson v. State, 447
S.W.2d 927 (rex. Crim. App. 1969) (challenging unsuccessfully a thirty-year sentence for
unlawful sale of marijuana under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause)). The forty-
year jail term imposed on the defendant in Davis may have been based in part on his
unpopularity. See supra note 80. See also United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984, 990
(2d Cir. 1985) (finding excessive a nine year criminal contempt sentence for a terror-
ist).
Professor Packer sees a danger of excessive jail sentences justified by the need to
incapacitate, when no desert-based maximum exists. Using incapacitation as a justifica-
tion, those who commit minor offenses conceivably could be kept in prison for long
NON-CAPITAL SENTENCING
In a case such as Harmelin, the state of Michigan should have the
option of sentencing the defendant harshly if it views as paramount the
need to deter others from possessing large amounts of cocaine. Under an
approach to the Eighth Amendment encompassing limiting retributivism,
a state would be able to impose a sentence. based largely on its per-
ceived deterrent needs." 7 If the sentence greatly exceeded what the
defendant deserved to receive for the crime,398 however, the sentence
would be invalidated, notwithstanding any claimed utilitarian bene-
fits.
Unlike the opinion of Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Harmelin recognizes some limitation in the Eighth Amendment to grossly
disproportionate sentences." ' Kennedy's opinion, and the many cases
since Harmelin utilizing Kennedy's approach 0 however, suffer from
the lack of any firm, articulated basis for a principle of proportionality.
Justice Kennedy's defense of a limited proportionality principle relies
primarily on previous Supreme Court opinions, which themselves are
questionable in their interpretation or result. Understandably, cases
subsequent to Harmelin reflect a broad confusion as to what proportional-
ity means under the Eighth Amendment, why we need it, and how we
should apply such a principle.4 ' Limiting retributivism offers at least a
philosophical basis, consistent with the Eighth Amendment,4" for
adopting and implementing a meaningful requirement of proportionality.
periods until they are no longer deemed dangerous by some psychologist or conections
board. PACKER, supra note 200, at 51. This is what happened in In re Lynch, 503 P.2d
921 (Cal. 1972), see supra note 284, and In re Rodriguez, 537 P.2d 384, 384 (Cal. 1975)
(defendant served 22 years of life sentence for minor sex offense, until released by
court).
See also Francis A. Allen, The Rehabilitative Ideal, in CONTBMORARY PUNISHMNT,
supra note 360, at 214-15 (making the same observation regarding the use of a need to
rehabilitate rationale to justify excessive sentences).
', See supra notes 390-94 and accompanying text.
an Absent other objectifying methods of determining what the defendant deserved (or
more precisely whether her sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed),
the criteria adopted by the Court in Solem, see supra notes 159-83 and accompanying
text, and utilized by Justice White in his dissent in Harmelin, see supra notes 334-51 and
accompanying text, would serve this end best.
3' Hannelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98, 1001 (1991) (plurality opinion as to
Parts I-IV; majority opinion as to Part V) (Kennedy, J., concun-ing).
See cases cited supra note 325.
4o See cases cited supra note 352.
In the language of moral theory, the Bill of Rights is an "attempt to formulate
reasonable deontological restrictions of principle on the pursuit of social utility."
MuR Py, supra note 317, at 223.
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CONCLUSION
Due to a series of flawed opinions by the Supreme Court regarding
a proportionality principle in non-capital cases, there is considerable
uncertainty and confusion over the existence, extent, and application of
such a principle. With a majority of the Court having recognized that the
Eighth Amendment bans sentences grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed, it is incumbent upon the Court to develop an analytical
framework for application of this constitutional standard.
The Court should adopt an approach based on the concept of limiting
retributivism. Application of this approach would require consideration
of the seriousness of the crime, the harshness of the sentence, and how
other comparable offenders are treated in the subject jurisdiction and in
other jurisdictions. Such an approach, borrowing from accepted philo-
sophical justifications of punishment, would be sensitive to important
constitutional considerations, such as legislative primacy and federalism,
yet preserve the crucial role of the judiciary in protecting individual
rights.
[Vol. 84
